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Europeans can be proud as they look back on ﬁ fty years of peaceful integration. Nowa-
days many people worldwide see the European Union as a model of how states and their 
citizens can work together in peace and freedom. However, this achievement does not 
automatically mean that the EU has the ability to deal with the problems of the future 
in a rapidly changing world. The European Union must continue developing its unity in 
diversity dynamically, be it with regard to energy issues, the euro, climate change or new 
types of conﬂ ict. Indeed, self-assertion and solidarity are key to the debates shaping our 
future.
 
“Europe in Dialogue“ wishes to make a contribution to these open debates. The analy-
ses in this series subject political concepts, processes and institutions to critical scrutiny 
and suggest ways of reforming internal and external European policymaking so that it 
is ﬁ t for the future. However, “Europe in Dialogue“ is not merely trying to encourage 
an intra-European debate and makes a point of including authors from non-EU states. 
Looking at an issue from different angle or from afar creates a shift in perspective which, 
in turn, renders Europe‘s development more meaningful as it engages in critical dialogue 
with other societies.
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New Proposals for Cooperation  
in the Mediterranean 
Christian-Peter Hanelt and Julia Seiler 
The remarkable developments underway across North Africa since 
December 2010 continue to captivate observers worldwide. Tunisians, 
Egyptians and Libyans have successfully ousted dictators and are pursuing 
their desire to live in freedom, dignity and justice. Citizens and leaders in these 
countries have been eager to organize elections and draft constitutional 
processes. But they still need to deliver internal security and provide solutions 
to socioeconomic inequalities.  
From Morocco to Turkey 
In spring 2011, as these changes were underway, the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
held in Rabat, Morocco, its 13th Kronberg Talks. The conference focused on 
recalibrating Europe‟s relations with its southern neighbors in light of the 
ongoing upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In the Europe in Dialogue 
volume, The Future of the Mediterranean – Which Way for Europe and North Africa?, 
published on the eve of the conference, the Bertelsmann Stiftung asked 
renowned scholars and activists from North Africa to offer their opinion and 
suggest actions Europe could – and should – take in order to support 
transformation processes in the region.  
Europe‟s quite late reaction to the Arab Uprising as well as the financial 
crisis, however, have limited the EU‟s capability to act as transformation 
partner. Cooperation with an effective partner would support Europe‟s efforts 
and help restore its credibility in its immediate southern neighborhood.  
8 Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean 
 
Turkey as a regional soft power 
Turkey has for decades been a valuable partner for Europe. It also enjoys a 
solid reputation and considerable influence among Arab and predominantly 
Muslim countries. Since 2001, Turkey‟s new foreign and domestic policy 
approach has facilitated its rise as a regional power and key actor in the Middle 
East. Turkey intensified its relations with the EU and its individual member 
states despite the stop-and-go EU accession process. At the same time, it 
began looking eastward, strengthening ties with its direct neighbors and other 
ascendent regional powers such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Having 
experienced a severe economic crisis itself in 2002 and 2003, Turkey emerged 
from the global financial crisis relatively unscathed, deepening its business and 
trade relations with Europe and countries across the region from Russia to 
(Central) Asia.  
In 2001, Turkey‟s AKP (Justice and Development Party) successfully 
integrated Islamist forces into an official party and the parliamentary system. 
Following its electoral success in 2002, the governing AKP implemented 
sound economic policies leading Turkey out of severe financial crisis. Indeed, 
continued economic growth throughout the following years helped the party 
win another electoral mandate in 2007.  
In response to EU accession conditions, the AKP-led government 
implemented several reforms in the early 2000s aimed at increasing 
transparency and strengthening minority rights, the latter to a limited extent 
only. The government even placed further constraints on the traditionally 
strong influence of the Turkish armed forces – a noteworthy development in a 
region where civilian control over military institutions is common. Parallel to 
the military‟s retreat from political affairs, civil society organizations 
flourished. Motivated by the prospect of EU membership, various institutions 
and organizations have fought for individual and political rights, such as 
freedom of expression, women‟s rights and political participation.  
Despite continued shortcomings in areas related to freedom of expression 
and minorities‟ rights, the positive developments witnessed in Turkey have 
made the country a pioneer in a region dominated by non-democratic regimes. 
In order to respond capably to the regional developments unleashed in 2011, 
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Europe must look eastward for a strategic partnership. The Bertelsmann 
Stiftung was thus very pleased when the Istanbul Policy Center of the 
renowned Sabancı University invited us to hold the 14th Kronberg Talks in 
Istanbul in May of 2012 to discuss politics and development in the 
Mediterranean with a focus on European-Turkish cooperation.  
14th Kronberg Talks and Europe in Dialogue 
Since the 2011 Kronberg Talks in Morocco and its related edition of Europe 
in Dialogue, we have broadened our approach and examined the tasks that lay 
ahead: transformation processes in the Arab World, regional conflicts in the 
Middle East, and the opportunities and challenges inherent to migration across 
the Mediterranean. These issues call for sustainable and well-coordinated 
cooperation among several actors from different regions, each with different 
backgrounds, experiences and abilities. It is therefore important we maintain a 
continued dialogue in which each party involved can express itself open and 
freely. This edition of Europe in Dialogue aims to provide authors from 
Europe, Turkey, the Arab world and Israel the opportunity to voice a variety 
of opinions and perspectives on European-Turkish cooperation in the context 
of the Arab Uprising.  
Transformation partners 
The future of revolutionary Egypt, Tunisia and Libya continues to capture 
global attention. In Libya, where the situation remains unstable, long-running 
struggles and societal cleavages that predate Muammar al-Qadhafi‟s rule 
continue to shape developments. Whereas things look quite promising in 
Tunisia, establishing a constituent assembly in Egypt has proved to be a 
sensitive issue between the military council, Islamist and secular parties. 
Secular forces have driven revolutions, and elections are bringing Islamists to 
power: these developments present a new challenge for Europe. How will 
Islamist parties shape their foreign policies, in particular their policies toward 
Europe? The EU, for its part, having called for expanded political 
participation and democratic elections in these countries, must acknowledge 
the Islamists‟ electoral victories if it is to remain credible. The example of 
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Turkey illustrates how Islamist parties might successfully manage a state 
economy while maintaining strong ties with the West.  
Contributors Almut Möller (DGAP; Berlin), Ziad Majed (American 
University of Paris), Nilgün Arısan Eralp (TEPAV, Ankara) and Nathalie 
Tocci (IAI, Rome) explore these issues, elaborating on the opportunities and 
obstacles inherent to cooperation between Turkey and the EU in supporting 
developments in the Arab world. The authors agree that Turkey‟s diplomatic 
skills, regional influence and its know-how in managing a staggering economy 
are valuable contributions to a partnership that targets transformation. Indeed, 
Turkey is well-positioned to shape things positively given its history, 
predominantly Muslim population, and ongoing experience with political 
transformation. Ziad Majed discusses within this context Turkey‟s flexible 
foreign policy as facilitative of a collective European-Turkish initiative.  
Europe, by contrast, has established specific policy instruments and 
institutions in order to support development in its southern neighborhood. 
One such instrument, the EU‟s customs union, is often highlighted as a 
potentially effective means of supporting transformation in the region. 
Advocating stronger foreign policy dialogue between Turkey and the EU, 
Nathalie Tocci calls for the establishment of institutional mechanisms through 
which a specific European-Turkish dialogue might take place. In addition to 
these points, the authors also address potential stumbling blocks to Turkish-
European cooperation, in particular the stalled EU accession process and the 
EU‟s internal divisions. Noting the divisive impact of the euro crisis on the 
EU, Almut Möller suggests here that a “two-speed” Europe could provide 
individual European member states the opportunity to strengthen relations 
with neighboring countries. Pointing to Turkey‟s popularity among its Arab 
neighbors, Nilgün Arısan Eralp warns against the dangers of Turkey being 
perceived as a dominant or hegemonic power among its Arab neighbors. 
Given this and other factors such as stalled reforms in Turkey, she 
underscores the need for institutionalized dialogue if joint efforts are to 
succeed.  
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Conflict resolution 
Reflections on the Arab Uprising must consider other regional 
developments, such as the international struggle for change in Syria, the 
dispute over the Iranian nuclear program and the ongoing conflict between 
Israelis and Palestinians. Contributors Fuat Keyman (IPC, Istanbul), Dorothée 
Schmid (IFRI, Paris), Ghassan Khatib (bitterlemons.org, Ramallah) and Yossi 
Alpher (bitterlemons.org, Tel Aviv) take on these issues in discussing Turkey 
and the EU as regional players in conflict resolution. Taking stock of 
individual countries‟ priorities, they identify possible areas for fruitful EU-
Turkish cooperation. In her contribution, Dorothée Schmid points out how 
the EU and Turkey, despite their shared interests of stability and security, do 
not necessarily share the same objectives. They differ, for example, in their 
(foreign) policy approaches to the plight of Cyprus or the Kurds, and in their 
handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Focusing on this latter point, Yossi 
Alpher also suggests that a stronger EU-US effort to get Turkey and Israel 
closer together could be helpful. Ghassan Khatib, who criticizes Europe for 
prioritizing short-term strategic goals at the expense of establishing genuine 
stability in the Mediterranean, illustrates how Turkey‟s reputation for 
trustworthiness tops that of Europe. He sees in regional partnerships with 
institutions such as the Arab League an opportunity to undergird with greater 
credibility both Turkey and Europe‟s efforts. Underscoring Turkey‟s unique 
position, Fuat Keyman reminds us that citizens in Arab countries are reluctant 
to accept a democratization process initiated by outside actors or controlled by 
military forces. 
Opportunities and challenges posed by migration 
The third issue addressed in this Europe in Dialogue edition deals with 
migration and the opportunities and challenges it poses for Europe, Turkey 
and the Mediterranean. Countries in both Europe and the Mediterranean are 
increasingly interlinked through the effects of countless migration processes. 
Some 20 million people in the EU (4% of Europe‟s total population) do not 
have European citizenship. According to the most recent eurostat figures 
(Statistics in focus 34/2011), Turkish and Moroccan nationals represent the 
largest number of foreigners living in the EU. The number of asylum-seekers 
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in Europe has increased by 19 percent in 2011. According to the UNHCR, the 
number of Tunisian nationals seeking asylum in Europe increased ninefold for 
the same period, while claims by Libyans rose fivefold and claims by Syrian 
nationals increased by an alarming 68 percent. By March 2012, 17,000 refugees 
from Syria were registered in Turkish refugee camps.  
Contributors Rana Islam (Berlin), Thomas Straubhaar and Seçil Paçacı 
Elitok (HWWI, Hamburg) and Ayhan Kaya (Bilgi University, Istanbul) 
address the situation of migrants in Turkey and the EU and the perception 
within Arab countries of Turkish and European migration policies. 
Highlighting problems of integration and issues of public debate, they explore 
the attendant economic, political and cultural advantages to migration, calling 
for a more open and positive attitude towards migrant populations. They 
emphasize the benefits of circular temporary and regulated work migration in 
decreasing illegal migration and reducing the demographic gap in Europe. 
Rana Islam criticizes the effects of security interests in shaping migration 
policies in many European coutries, which does little to mitigate the right-wing 
extremism faced by an increasing number of immigrants in Europe. Ayhan 
Kaya suggests that Turkey, as an important net migration country, could play a 
key role in regulating circular migration. He therefore calls for an improved 
Turkish immigration policy and the need for a public debate on migration. 
Thomas Straubhaar and Seçil Paçacı Elitok, noting Turkey‟s prospective shift 
from being a labor exporter to a labor importer country, support the idea of a 
comprehensive, far-sighted migration policy for Turkey and Europe.  
We would like to express our thanks to all those who have supported us in 
compiling this edition. We thank the authors for contributing their ideas and 
time to this edition and the conference. We owe a particular debt of gratitude 
to Ahmet Evin and his team at the Istanbul Policy Center for their energetic 
and invaluable support. Ahmet Evin proved integral to the process with his 
valuable input and recommendations of Turkish scholars. We thank as well 
Barbara Serfozo and Mehmet Beşikçi for their editorial efforts with the 
English and Turkish versions of this edition, and Dieter Dollacker for his 
support with layout and graphics. Last but certainly not least, we want to 
thank Ruth Martens, who supported us during the editing process with 
valuable comments and contributed to this introduction. 
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Before passing the baton to our authors, please allow us to briefly highlight 
some of the recommendations offered here on how the EU and Turkey might 
support sustainable development in the Mediterranean. 
Key points at a glance 
Transformation partners 
• In order to support transformation in Arab countries and the resolution of 
regional conflicts, Europe and Turkey should act in accordance with their 
respective strengths. Whereas Europe has the necessary expertise and 
established institutional frameworks for multilateral cooperation (i.e., 
European Neighborhood Policy, European-Mediterranean Partnership, 
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), enlargement policy and transformation 
partnerships), Turkey is a flexible and credible actor in the region. It is a 
valuable source of inspiration for its neighbors, thanks to its own experience 
with democratization and development.  
• Existing institutions of cooperation (UfM) should be strengthened to 
support the dialogue between various actors and carry out measures 
targeting capacity-building.  
• Carefully planned and implemented investments, free-trade agreements and 
the expansion of the customs union to the southern Mediterranean 
countries could support economic and migration policies. 
• Second-track diplomacy should foster civil society cooperation parallel to 
official or intergovernmental agreements. 
 Paying better attention to the needs specific to a country will help prevent 
regional NGOs from being overburdened. 
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Conflict resolution 
• Europe and Turkey should avoid double standards: security and economic 
interests should not be prioritized over human rights and democracy.  
• Europe and Turkey should be more adamant in seeking peaceful solutions 
to the Middle East conflict and the controversy over the Iranian nuclear 
program.  
• Cooperation with regional actors like the Arab League is essential in order to 
avoid perceptions of hegemonic powers afoot in the region. 
Migration across the Mediterranean 
• Differentiating accurately between Islam and Islamism is crucial to fostering 
sound foreign policies and sensible integration debates. Reflecting upon 
commonly used terminology will help battle stereotypes and right-wing 
extremism from taking hold.  
• Europe should establish a common, far-sighted and strategic migration 
policy instead of a fortress policy. 
• Circular migration policies and a target-oriented migration policy could help 
mitigate illegal migration. Turkey, as an important transit country, could play 
a crucial role in these efforts. 
• Migrants‟ countries of destination could benefit from providing immigrants 
a good educational framework.
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The Possibility of a “Transformational Partnership” 
between Turkey and the EU: Will “Opportunity” 
Become Reality? 
Nilgün Arısan Eralp 
Although both Turkey and the European Union have accepted the need to 
respond to the turbulent transformation process in the Arab world – albeit 
with a certain amount of delay – they have not yet approached the region 
jointly, an alternative offering the opportunity to craft a more effective, value-
based and forward-looking strategy (Soler i Lecha 2011: 27). Indeed, the EU 
and Turkey as yet lack any institutionalized process of dialogue regarding the 
transformation in the Arab world, much less a combined strategy. However, 
the two have both a historical responsibility and a present-day opportunity to 
act together by combining their energies and potential in the design of a new 
policy toward the region. The transformation in the Arab world will not only 
check the attractiveness and transformative power of the post-enlargement 
EU and change the dynamics of Turkey‟s relationship with the Union, but will 
also test the new role Turkey has sought for itself in the Middle East (Krastev 
2011: 1). 
Turkey’s present instruments and strategies for supporting 
Arab countries undergoing transformation 
In examining Turkey‟s present efforts to support Arab countries undergoing 
transformation, instruments are more clearly discernible than strategies per se. 
The main factors driving government behavior in this area include the 
country‟s newly active foreign policy within its region and its increasing 
attempts to “lead by example.” The regime‟s guiding idea seems to be to serve 
as a “source of inspiration” or to provide a “demonstrative effect” (Ülgen 
2011b: 1). 
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As Daniel Dombey pointed out in a Financial Times article titled “Turkish 
Diplomacy: An Attentive Neighbor” on 26 February 2012, “not since the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire nine decades ago has Turkey played a more active role 
in the Middle East and beyond.” This active policy, which has also been 
described as a “sea change” (Tocci and Walker 2010: 1), started with Turkey 
playing a more significant role as a regional mediator, followed by a diplomatic 
activism enhanced by economic and trade links and a liberal visa policy toward 
nearby countries (Soler i Lecha 2011: 27). The declared objective was to 
promote a stable and prosperous neighborhood through encouraging greater 
economic integration between Turkey and the Arab world (Kirişci 2011a: 43), 
putting a special emphasis on the free movement of people.  
This essentially autonomous foreign policy has been shaped by a number of 
broad international currents, including the end of the Cold War and the 
world‟s emerging multipolarity, the events following 9/11, the U.S. invasion of 
and withdrawal from Iraq, the fragile nature of global economic system, the 
exclusion of Turkey from Europe‟s architecture by some EU member states 
and the subsequent stalling of EU accession negotiations, and finally the 
vacuum in the region created by the reduction of U.S. influence. All these 
factors have redefined Turkey‟s geopolitical situation and increased the 
regional emphasis in its foreign policy (Kardaş 2011: 34). 
However, in the environment created by the recent transformations in the 
Arab world, conditions have become less conducive to autonomous action 
(Özel 2012: 4), especially as the number of cases necessitating multilateral 
action and assistance (such as Libya and Syria) has increased. This has again 
brought Turkey closer to its Western partners. The rising number of other 
actors competing for influence in the region, with Iran and Russia serving as 
prominent examples, has played a significant role in this rapprochement. 
In this context, although Turkey has adopted a pro-democracy position vis-
à-vis the transformation in the Arab world, it lacks an explicit strategy toward 
this end. Yet even in the absence of such a strategy, Turkey has exerted a 
definite appeal for countries going through uncertain transformations. 
Affinities in the areas of religion and culture have played a crucial role in this 
regard, although other important factors are also in play. 
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A recent survey covering 16 Middle Eastern countries by the Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), an Istanbul-based think 
tank, showed Turkey to be the most highly regarded country in the eyes of the 
people of the region (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012: 21). Interestingly enough, in 
survey respondents‟ citation of the country as a model for the region, as its 
future economic leader and as the country that contributes most to peace, 
Turkey‟s Muslim identity was only the third most important factor, behind the 
fact of its democratic rule and its working economy.  
Turkey‟s “demonstrative effect” operates through its economic performance 
and liberal trade policies, accompanied by its liberal visa policy (Kirişci 2011: 
46). On the other hand, being “a country with a predominantly Muslim 
population which can fully implement the core values driving the Arab Spring: 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities” 
clearly plays a crucial role (Verheugen 2012: 3). To a considerable extent, 
Turkey owes the establishment of these values within its domestic sphere to its 
EU accession process, which has served as an important catalyst in the 
country‟s recent political, economic and social transformation.  
It is hence clear that Turkey‟s appeal in the region is an important 
instrument, and that the country‟s EU accession process has played a 
significant role in the construction of this appeal, alongside the country‟s own 
economic performance and political model. In order to convert this appeal to 
political leverage within the region, Turkey should share its experience in areas 
such as political reform, economic reform and institution building, thus 
contributing to economic growth and sustainable democratization in the 
region.  
Where could the EU and Turkey cooperate?  
The European Union has long struggled to promote democratic reform and 
economic modernization in North Africa and the Middle East, typically by 
engaging in regional cooperation and trade liberalization in the form of 
bilateral association agreements. Although it largely failed to achieve its 
regional objectives, the EU has been motivated by the belief that establishing 
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EU norms and practices in the Mediterranean would reduce the significant 
economic and political gap between the EU and countries in the region (Soler 
i Lecha 2011: 27).  
Since 1995, when the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was created, 
the EU has implemented specific policies geared toward the Mediterranean 
region; however, these have not included policies similar to the EU project 
itself.  
From the EMP‟s initiation in 1995 to the 2004 incorporation of 
Mediterranean countries into the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and 
the 2008 launch of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as a replacement 
for the EMP, and even in the case of the “Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” of 2011, the European 
Union has struggled to find a successful framework and strategy for relations 
with its Mediterranean partners. The various efforts have in many respects 
sought to complement one another: The ENP focuses on EU‟s bilateral 
relations with each partner, for example, while the EMP and its successor 
UfM have provided forums where all the countries can meet together.  
Unfortunately, these policies have not successfully closed the region‟s 
income and democratic-governance gap with the European Union. Indeed, 
they even served to strengthen authoritarian regimes (Grant 2011: 1), resulting 
in a loss of credibility for the EU in the region. The main weakness of the 
UfM and its predecessor EMP was a focus on states or governments, with 
comparatively less emphasis on private sector and NGO development. On the 
other hand, ENP has focused extensively on improving the economic 
environment rather than putting any significant emphasis on the promotion of 
democracy, human rights or the rule of law. 
Consequently, the European Union has decided that in creating a regional 
policy better adapted to the current circumstances, it should offer more in 
terms of “money, markets and mobility,” while implementing stricter terms of 
conditionality (Grant 2011: 2).  
Taking all these past weaknesses into consideration, the EU has responded 
to the transformation in the Arab world with 2011‟s “Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.” The 
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emphasis of this program is on democratic transformation and institution 
building through person-to-person contact, as well as urban and rural 
development through the improvement of educational and health systems. 
Further areas of engagement include the protection of fundamental freedoms, 
constitutional and judiciary reform, and the fight against corruption 
(Schumacher 2011: 109).The approach taken to implementation is one of 
“more for more and less for less,” in the sense that delivery of aid is to be 
conditional on performance in the areas of democracy and human rights. In 
other words, unlike in the past, the EU aims this time to associate a strict 
conditionality with its aid. 
Despite its weaknesses, the EU‟s greatest asset at the moment is the rich 
expertise regarding the North Africa and Middle East region acquired through 
the pursuit of its previous policies. There is wide consensus that these policies 
have enabled the EU to acquire financial and institutional resources that 
Turkey lacks. Conversely, Turkey enjoys a level of popularity within the Arab 
public that the EU has lost over the last decades. It would thus be wise for the 
EU and Turkey to combine their strengths, as both parties have an interest in 
fostering economic development as well as a sustainable pattern of broader 
development within their joint neighborhood. This gives the two parties a 
foundation on which to build working cooperation in the region. 
Although the European Union has not itself been regarded as a political 
model within the Arab world, European or universal values have played a 
significant role in establishing Turkey as a source of inspiration. Arab 
protesters do not regard European societies as a model for imitation, but 
during the uprisings they have demanded that important European values and 
norms such as democracy, freedom and an end to corruption be respected – 
all of which have to a certain extent been established in Turkey through the 
country‟s EU accession process. These are also the norms that the European 
Union has long aspired to institutionalize in these countries. The primary areas 
of engagement within the EU‟s new strategic approach to the area – 
specifically, protection for fundamental freedoms, constitutional and judicial 
reform, and the fight against corruption – have long been important 
constituents of Turkey‟s own transformation process, again due to the EU 
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accession process. For this reason, Turkey‟s appeal in the region gives it the 
potential to fill Europe‟s “credibility gap” (Soler i Lecha 2011: 27). 
In the above-noted TESEV survey, respondents were asked whether a 
Turkish accession to the EU would benefit the Union in the region overall. 
“Sixty percent of respondents said Turkish accession would have a positive 
effect on the EU‟s regional role” (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012: 22).  
Hence, cooperation between EU and Turkey would seem to have the 
potential to create a positive political and economic transformation in the 
Arab world, particularly if the parties can strengthen reformist forces in the 
Arab countries by developing projects that aim at grassroots-level capacity 
building. Turkey‟s business community and civil society can play an 
instrumental role toward this end. The declared willingness of the EU and 
Turkey to cooperate more closely in their foreign policy toward the region 
shows promise in this sense, although there has as yet been no sign of a joint 
strategy or even the establishment of a process of working dialogue on the 
issue.  
While Turkey‟s recent economic and political transformation process offers 
a very good showcase for the establishment of EU norms in the region, the 
country‟s customs union with the EU could also be very useful (Ülgen 
October 2011: 2). If this experience could be extended to the region as a 
whole, replacing the EU‟s free trade agreements with individual Arab 
countries, it might initiate a process of economic integration able to trigger 
much-needed economic growth in addition to political transformation.  
Possible obstacles to successful partnership  
Although the prospect of an EU-Turkey strategic partnership vis-à-vis the 
Arab world holds strong potential for the stimulation of sustainable 
democratization and economic growth, significant obstacles to any such 
cooperation may yet stem from the EU, from Turkey and/or from the 
relations between them.  
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Internal EU problems such as the euro crisis, persistent threats to the 
Union‟s economic and financial foundations, and the potential collapse of the 
Schengen system (Soler i Lecha 2011: 29) could disrupt an otherwise 
successful partnership between Turkey and the EU. The EU financial crisis 
might easily limit the amount of money allocated to new policy toward the 
Arab world. On the other hand, the (already extant) risk of an immense inflow 
of illegal migrants and the specter of Islamic fundamentalism could easily 
result in widespread objections within the European public to the provision of 
additional EU support to the Arab world.  
Another potential impediment to efficient partnership between EU and 
Turkey stems from shortcomings in the construction of EU‟s foreign policy. 
EU countries in many cases lack consensus, making it difficult to arrive at a 
joint strategy. Unless there is efficient coordination of member state policies, 
bilateral problems between Turkey and any individual member state could 
undermine joint activity between the broader Union and Turkey toward the 
Arab world.  
Turkey‟s vulnerability as a source of inspiration is another factor that could 
become a serious disruption in any partnership between the EU and Turkey. 
This vulnerability stems both from the slowdown in Turkey‟s domestic 
political reform process and the instability of its economic performance. 
Turkish democratization is still a work in progress, and has suffered serious 
recent setbacks, particularly in the areas of fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law. If such a situation were to persist, it would seriously undermine the 
country‟s transformative power in the region. In addition, the Turkish 
economy‟s sensitivity to rising oil prices and dependence on the performance 
of EU economies both comprise risk factors in the country‟s ability to assist 
Arab countries during the difficult period of transformation.  
Turkey‟s fragile democratization process is closely linked with its EU 
accession process, which has been stalled for several years. In principle, the 
initiation of accession negotiations constitutes the beginning of an irreversible 
process in which the candidate country‟s membership prospects become 
gradually clearer over time. However, this has not been the case for Turkey 
(Arısan Eralp 2011: 1), as half of its negotiation chapters have been blocked 
for political reasons. Although Turkey has been engaged in accession 
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negotiations for more than six years, joining the EU has domestically become 
almost a non-issue, with the accession debate today having very little effect on 
internal transformation processes. This situation presents the most serious risk 
to foreign policy cooperation with the European Union “unless there is a 
boost to accession negotiations, or at the very least, EU movement toward 
visa liberalization with Turkey” (Soler i Lecha 2011: 29). 
More broadly, Turkey itself should seek to avoid repeating the mistakes of 
the European Union‟s previous Middle East and North Africa policies, which 
were torn between upholding Europe‟s values and its interests, and ultimately 
failed to deliver the promised “money, markets and mobility.” As noted by 
Charles Grant, “many EU leaders perceived an inevitable contradiction 
between Europe‟s values and its interests, and chose to prioritize the latter” 
(Grant 2011:1). Turkey should avoid falling into this trap, and avoid behaving 
as a regional superpower seeking to dominate others. Any such behavior has 
the potential to remind neighbors of the negative legacy of Turkey‟s imperial 
past (Verheugen 2012: 3). Rather, it can play an important role by serving as a 
source of inspiration that offers assistance, shares best practices and gives 
guidance.  
Looking ahead 
As the Arab world‟s transformation evolves in the direction of creating 
economically prosperous and democratic countries, it is increasingly obvious 
that this process can best be helped through transnational cooperation 
(Bishara 2012: 19). Given the complicated and uncertain nature of the 
transformation in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the scope of 
the opportunities at stake, both Turkey and the European Union feel a 
responsibility to help restore respect for human rights, support a sustainable 
democratization process and contribute to economic growth in the region. A 
successful regional policy partnership between the EU and Turkey would 
strengthen both parties‟ positions. However, the significant potential 
underlying any such partnership can be realized only if dialogue between the 
parties is institutionalized. If this fails to take place, each party will be “torn 
between being a relevant actor in the region and a simple spectator that 
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continues to be overwhelmed by local and regional political developments” 
(Schumacher 2011: 108).  
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Crossing Borders or Introvert Union? 
The Euro Crisis and the EU’s Relations  
with its Southern Neighbors  
Almut Möller 
A year and a half into the Arab awakening, the European Union is facing a 
dual challenge. The first challenge has to do with the Union itself: The 
financial, economic and sovereign debt crises and the loss of competitiveness 
of a number of EU member countries have called into question the Union‟s 
prosperity, its economic and social cohesion, and even its attractiveness for 
both its citizens and potential new members. 
The second challenge to the European Union is an external one, resulting 
from the Arab awakening and the changing political landscapes in the 
southern Mediterranean. Since early 2011, EU countries have been facing a 
new order emerging in their southern neighborhood – an order that at least 
for the time being hardly looks “ordered.”  
In this essay I will examine the links between these challenges, and explore 
what impact the internal state of the European Union has on its external 
relations with its southern neighbors. While both the internal and the external 
challenges entail a great deal of uncertainty and even risk, I will argue that they 
also offer opportunities for a true renewal of the Union‟s relations with its 
neighbors – a renewal that may help the EU continue to deliver on its promise 
of peace and prosperity for its citizens.  
The impact of the Euro crisis on the EU’s internal  
cohesion: Toward a new “two-speed” Europe 
As of the time of writing, in the spring of 2012, there is cautious optimism 
within the EU‟s capitals that the most acute symptoms of the sovereign debt 
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crisis in Greece and other euro zone countries have been successfully 
addressed. Apart from addressing immediate crisis issues, EU countries agreed 
to reinforce existing rules and establish new ones aimed at limiting future 
accumulation of sovereign debt, which was widely (though not unanimously) 
considered one of the main roots of the crisis. 
However, even after two years of great distress, the EU and its members 
cannot simply slip from crisis mode into a state of “normality.” While austerity 
has been the word of the day for the last two years, the challenge now is to 
reestablish growth, jobs and competitiveness. In this task, several questions 
remain outstanding: How can EU members strengthen the Union so that it 
again manages to compete successfully in a globalized world increasingly 
shaped by emerging powers? Is what has been branded the “European model” 
– knowledge-based economies committed to social cohesion and 
environmental sustainability – still affordable? Now that the most acute crisis 
phase seems to be over, these fundamental issues remain to be addressed. 
Although the answer to the crisis has become “more Europe, not less,” EU 
nation-states remain hesitant to give up or share additional competences in 
economic and social affairs at the supranational level. And throughout the 
crisis, centrifugal forces have intensified across the European Union. The 
United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, which decided not to sign the new 
“Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union” adopted in March 2012 – the former country even forcing 
other EU members into a legal solution outside of the Lisbon Treaty – are the 
most vivid examples, but clearly not the only ones. Across the Union, 
euroskepticism is on the rise, and anti-EU campaigns are gaining ground. 
It is fair to ask whether the Union of 27 members has reached the limits of 
its governability. It will clearly be even more difficult to steer the Union in the 
future. It was against this background that 17 members of the euro zone 
ultimately decided to act on their own, and in the course of the fall of 2011 
agreed to move toward a “real” fiscal union. For now, the steps being taken in 
this direction look rather timid, but they will set a course for further activity in 
the years to come. Under the pressure of the crisis, the euro zone has finally 
started to complete its dysfunctional economic and monetary union. 
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Eight non-euro members declared that they want to stay as close as they can 
to the euro zone “core,” but this cannot mask the fact that being “in” or “out” 
of the euro zone matters. And it will matter even more in the future, when 
new modes of governance within the euro zone show their impact. 
Consequently, there is a risk that the gap between the “core” and the 
periphery, between the “ins” and the “outs” of the euro zone, will increasingly 
widen. 
How much asynchronicity can the European Union of 27 members handle? 
Clearly, the internal coherence of the EU-27 will be challenged by this 
development. But the prospect of a two-speed Europe might not be such a 
bad thing for the relationship between the European Union and its neighbors. 
A looser periphery within the EU might create new opportunities for the 
external periphery of the Union. 
A two-speed EU might actually be able to deal much better with the 
countries in its neighborhood than the EU-27 does at present, because the 
neighbors could more easily become part of a wider European Union 
essentially defined by the common market. 
However, much depends on whether the EU continues a policy of 
introversion as a response to the crisis in the years ahead, or instead embraces 
its changing southern neighborhood with fresh ideas for closer cooperation. 
External relations in times of austerity:  
Toward an ever more introverted Union? 
How will the crisis impact the European Union‟s foreign policy? First and 
foremost, the Union has lost a great deal of credibility and attractiveness over 
the last two years, not only among its own citizens but also in its 
neighborhood and around the world. The European Union was once viewed 
with great interest from both inside and outside its borders, and the prospect 
of neighborly relations – or in Turkey‟s case, accession to the Union – was a 
policy offer that appealed to many leaders and citizens in the southern 
neighborhood. 
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Today, many depict the European Union as obsolete, torn apart by widening 
internal gaps and deficient institutions. Within the Arab neighborhood, many 
forces formerly in the opposition blame the EU for having prioritized stability 
interests over its avowed values, cooperating with and thereby perpetuating 
the power of the old regimes. 
European foreign policy must currently operate within the context of this 
perception. And indeed, its effects have already begun to limit the clout of the 
EU‟s external action (see the findings of the European Foreign Policy 
Scorecard 2012, published by the European Council on Foreign Relations). 
Furthermore, efforts to strengthen EU foreign policy, an objective declared 
by EU members only recently to be a high priority, have lost momentum. EU 
governments are largely focused on economic and financial issues, and foreign 
policy has all but fallen off the radar. Of course, this is not to suggest that EU 
members altogether lack a foreign policy at the moment. But the impetus to 
strengthen joint EU approaches has lost steam in many of the EU‟s capitals, 
despite the promises of the Lisbon Treaty. 
EU members‟ intervention in Libya, complicated by Germany‟s March 2011 
U.N. Security Council opposition to military action, is a good example. So too 
has been the hesitance to further develop the foreign and security instruments 
laid down in the Lisbon Treaty (for instance, by engaging in permanent 
structured cooperation), or the apparent lack of vision in making use of the 
new External Action Service. EU governments currently appear rather 
unimaginative when it comes to EU foreign policy – precisely at a point in 
time when creative thinking is needed with regard to the Union‟s southern 
neighborhood, which has begun a transition toward a new, largely uncertain 
future. 
Is it only a question of time before the dust settles over the euro crisis and 
EU governments again devote more time and resources to a Union foreign 
policy? Unfortunately, this is far from assured. It is not only the euro zone 
countries most affected by the crisis that have started to make serious budget 
cuts. In states across the European Union, austerity measures have been 
adopted that will mean less money available for expenditure on foreign and 
defense issues in the future. While this development will indeed require that 
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more rather than less cooperation take place at the EU level, politically 
speaking the pressure on EU governments to cooperate has not yet been high 
enough to compensate for the national cuts. 
Clearly, this is not a promising development with respect to the EU‟s 
foreign and security policy vis-à-vis its southern neighborhood. For example, 
if another Libya-like scenario in the southern neighborhood were to emerge, 
EU countries are not currently able to plan and carry out military interventions 
on their own. Even more importantly, they probably will not be able to do so in 
the future. Moreover, the United States has become much more selective in its 
engagement in the Middle East and North Africa region. The EU‟s security 
relationship with Turkey retains considerable potential, but has not yet 
launched properly. 
In engaging with its southern neighbors, the European Union has had 
recourse to a number of specific foreign policy instruments carried out largely 
by EU institutions – notably the European Commission and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) – rather than by national governments. These 
include enlargement policy (in the case of Turkey), the country-specific 
European Neighborhood Policy (covering Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria and 
Tunisia), and the interregional approach of the Barcelona Process/Union for 
the Mediterranean (UfM). 
However, none of these policy approaches has proved particularly 
successful so far. For a number of reasons within both the EU and Turkey, 
the prospects for Turkish EU membership have changed rather dramatically 
since the launch of accession negotiations in October 2005. As a response to 
the Arab awakening, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was revised 
in 2011 (see the joint communications of the High Representative and the 
Commission “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the 
Southern Mediterranean” of 8 March 2011, and “A New Response to a 
Changing Neighborhood” of 25 May 2011). 
According to these documents, the Union wants to focus its southern ENP 
on three “Ms”: money, mobility and markets (for a comprehensive overview 
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of the measures taken by the EU following the Arab uprisings see “The EU‟s 
Response to the Arab „Spring,‟ MEMO 11/918, 16 December 2011). 
But even though the European Union has increased its overall level of 
spending, loans and investment in its southern neighborhood since 2011, 
numbers suggest that this will not be enough to raise the southern ENP to a 
qualitatively new level. Promises of mobility (in the form of legal migration) 
and market access are even more questionable for the time being. Visa 
liberalization is a sensitive issue within the EU, and only time will tell if the 
proposed deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs) will ever 
be realized, or will significantly improve southern Mediterranean countries‟ 
access to the EU‟s common market. 
Finally, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was largely invisible when 
the Arab awakening started to unfold, and has remained so ever since, despite 
the growing need for a regional forum for exchange between EU countries 
and the southern Mediterranean. It is fair to argue that the UfM was never 
meant to be a political forum, but was rather aimed at facilitating expert 
cooperation on practical issues such as cleaning up the Mediterranean. 
However, if there had been a flourishing Euro-Mediterranean expert 
community at the end of 2010, it might have been able to play a bigger role 
over the last year and a half in facilitating dialogue and setting up new projects.  
Thus, while one has to acknowledge that after the initial stumbles of some 
of its members – most prominently, France – the EU did develop a response 
to the Arab awakening rather quickly, it is questionable whether the two 
documents of March and May 2011 live up to their promise of being a strategic 
response. 
Crossing borders: Fresh ideas for the  
Mediterranean neighborhood 
A strategic response to the Arab awakening and to the changing context of 
EU-Turkish relations would require a depth similar to that of the European 
Union‟s response to the fall of the Berlin Wall. At that time, the Union 
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adopted enlargement as the strategic tool used to transform the central and 
eastern European countries, most of which are today EU members. 
This is not to suggest that the European Union should offer the ENP 
countries the kind of membership it once offered to Hungary, Poland or 
Lithuania – and indeed, to Turkey. 
But the Union‟s response to the changes in its southern neighborhood 
should take a longer strategic view than what has been adopted by the EU‟s 
institutions to date. This is where the member state governments have to 
come in. This is a time for politics, not for the regulatory approaches on which 
both enlargement policy and the ENP are based. 
The question I want to put is in fact rather simple, and bridges the 
European Union‟s internal and external challenges: To what extent can the 
EU find solutions to its internal malaise through new modes of cooperation 
with its southern neighbors? Trade, technology, energy, security, 
demographics and natural resources are only some of the issues that 
necessarily underlie any such debate. The question is whether, two years into 
the European crisis, the EU and its members are willing and capable of 
engaging in fresh, bold, out-of-the-box thinking. 
For the last decade, the narrative regarding the southern Mediterranean has 
been predominantly negative, focusing largely on security concerns. Despite 
the neighborhood‟s uncertain future (and giving particular credit to those 
countries that have embarked on a process that may yield more open political 
systems and societies), can the European Union‟s members develop a positive 
narrative for their neighborly relations with the south Mediterranean? Crossing 
the conceptual borders that limited the old neighborhood models and 
developing a new vision for cooperation might give the stumbling Union a 
much-needed boost. 
For the southern neighbors in turn, it might be useful to start thinking of 
the European Union in a new way: As a result of the crisis, the EU is no 
longer a monolithic bloc (which in fact it never really was). During the course 
of 2011, the Union cemented and even accelerated its move toward a “two 
speed” Europe, with the euro zone forging ahead toward fiscal union. Let us 
assume for the moment it will succeed. This allows the other 10 EU members 
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to form a periphery with different levels of ambition. In this context, the 
European Union‟s neighbors should take the opportunity to think (or rethink) 
where they want their place to be in terms of relations with the new European 
Union.
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Turkey, Europe and the Arabs Next Door 
Ziad Majed 
The “Turkish model” of governance for export to the Arab world has 
become the subject of a growing number of conversations. This is due to 
Turkey‟s experience with, on the one hand, a strong military that once played a 
decisive political role and, on the other, a party with an Islamic identity elected 
to govern the country according to an agreed separation between religion and 
the state. 
Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Tunisia and Egypt organized 
their first-ever free, multiparty elections. Elections in Morocco, organized at 
the same time, resulted in an electoral breakthrough for the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Comparisons between these countries and Turkey thus 
increased in parallel with growing talk about the Turkish democratic 
experience, the moderation exercised by the Turkish AKP, the ruling party, 
and the need to draw lessons from Turkey‟s experience. 
The following pages are an attempt to explain how Turkey‟s role as a non-
Arab actor in the region has evolved to represent an alternative to the region‟s 
other non-Arab actor, Iran. It is also an exploration of what may inspire Arab-
Turkish relations, especially in terms of improving Turkish-European 
cooperation within the Mediterranean basin. 
The Middle East, 2003 – 2010 
For a number of years, the influence of Arab states in the formulation of 
policies and alliances within the Middle East has eroded while the roles played 
by Iran and Turkey in this regard have expanded. This shift took place as 
America began to play a more direct role with the Iraq war in 2003. However, 
in the last three years, America‟s engagement in the region has diminished as 
the U.S. military has begun to withdraw its troops from Iraq, and the Obama 
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administration has proved unable to revitalize the stalled peace process 
between Palestinians and Israelis.  
By contrast, during the period from 2003 to 2009, Iran appeared to be 
advancing its political interests and expanding its influence throughout the 
region. The Islamic Republic benefited from the rising price of oil over several 
years, using these dividends to develop its armaments and launch a “civil 
nuclear program” with supplies purchased from Russia. It also benefited 
strategically in geopolitical terms from the Americans‟ overthrow of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan on its eastern border and the Iraqi Ba‟ath 
regime on its western border. Tehran was thus liberated from the burdens of 
dealing with two hostile neighboring regimes which, at the same time, enabled 
it to adopt in its strategy the presence of Iranian allies with specific social and 
sectarian bases in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Particularly in Iraq, this 
guaranteed Iran not only direct access to the court of the Americans but also 
the ability to deepen their political and security problems. All of this was done 
with the goal of fortifying Iran‟s bargaining position with Washington more 
generally and, with an eye to the post-withdrawal scenario, of becoming an 
active partner in any transitional administration. In addition, through its 
alliance with Syria, its support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and its organic 
relationship with Hezbollah, Iran became a key player in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict with a foothold on the shores of the Mediterranean. The July 2006 
war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon attests to this fact. Iran‟s 
presence, reinforced both politically and militarily, was consolidated. 
Consequently, Tehran began to pursue a doctrine of containment for the 
adversaries and enemies of its nuclear program. It did so by threatening 
retaliation through some of its allies if attacked and by creating points of 
tension or conflict in several areas. Iran also proceeded to expand its influence 
within Lebanon via Hezbollah, which imposed its political interests on the 
national government. 
The paradox of Iran‟s ascendancy is that this became in itself a drain on 
Iran‟s expansionist capacity by posing a threat to a number of regimes in the 
region. It definitively ended the attempts of a number of states to maintain fair 
relations, albeit frigidly, with it. Iran‟s growing influence in the Middle East 
also exacerbated sectarian tensions, raising the specter of “Persian Shi‟ite 
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attempts to dominate Arab Sunni land,” a commonly repeated argument in 
many of the region‟s capitals hostile to Iranian policies. 
If we look at the escalating international sanctions and threats against 
Tehran due to the failure of negotiations over its nuclear program, and if we 
take into account the severe economic crisis and the renewed rift inside the 
regime between the Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad, 
we can conclude that Iran‟s expansion in the region is difficult to sustain. It 
has reached its climax, and it is no longer capable of expanding its political 
investment to additional areas. 
It thus appears that the United States and Iran have each lost some of their 
competing influences in recent years and that a new regional power could play 
a more important role. This is where Turkey emerges as a serious contender.  
Turkey: the key actor? 
Turkey, as a secular Muslim state at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and 
as a member of NATO, is of considerable economic, geostrategic and political 
importance. Many Turkish officials believe that Ankara, in building on this 
importance, must gradually assume a greater role in those areas left vacant by 
Washington and Teheran. Their faith in the use of “soft” power may explain 
the increased and extensive Turkish activity observed in the Middle East in 
recent years. 
In what has been called the “zero problem approach,” Turkey has for years 
cultivated good relations with most neighbors and regional actors as it pursued 
a balancing act domestically (between the ruling party and the secular military 
institution) and internationally (between states such as the United States and 
Iran and Syria). In the game of equilibriums, it has repeatedly sought out room 
to maneuver, even if within narrow margins. For example, as its relations with 
Israel have deteriorated, especially since the Israeli military attack against the 
“Gaza Freedom Flotilla” in 2010, Turkey maintained its alliance with the 
United States and tried to afford it greater attention. Efforts to work with Iran 
in finding a solution to the nuclear dilemma are balanced with attempts to 
coordinate with Saudi Arabia on other regional matters. Whereas Turkey‟s 
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security policy toward the Iraqi Kurds is restrictive, there is openness toward 
Baghdad. And finally, Turkey, as a Sunni nation (governed by a leadership 
with a Muslim Brotherhood background), is aware of the fact that it can 
exercise greater influence in Arab countries and in Palestine than can Iran.  
Turkey has generally remained cautious in its regional engagements and is 
keeping its options (and “lines of retreat”) open, apparently waiting to see 
what the tensions between Iran and the United States yield. While waiting for 
an outcome on that front, Turkey continues to work on its relationship with 
Europe, despite the recently closed door to Ankara‟s EU accession. 
Nevertheless, it is the developments in the Arab world in 2011, beginning 
with the revolutions in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, but particularly in Syria, which 
have presented the Turkish leadership with new challenges. The political map 
of the region is being redrawn, particularly in the Mediterranean states, and 
this development has reached Turkey‟s southern border. All of this has 
compelled Turkey to reassess its various positions and begin developing a new 
Middle Eastern policy that necessarily considers several issues.  
First, the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to claim electoral success in 
more than one country in the region. This has prompted discussions about the 
need to draw from the experience of the Justice and Development party in 
Turkey. Egypt and Tunisia are currently two states where these discussions 
could apply.  
Second, NATO‟s intervention in the war in Libya with a U.N. mandate to 
protect Libyan citizens raised several issues and opportunities for Turkey. By 
taking on an active role in defining the mission, and as the intervention 
evolved into ending the al-Qadhafi regime, Turkey entered into a new phase in 
its relations with Libya. 
Third, events in Syria demand a carefully considered recalibration of Turkish 
diplomacy. The Syrian regime has responded to a popular revolution with 
brutal repression, taking the lives of thousands within a few months. The 
violence of the regime has brought the country to a breaking point. Syria 
shares not only a long border with Turkey but close economic ties as well. The 
conflict therefore threatens Turkish interests directly, not only in terms of 
security and finance, but also with respect to the Kurdish issue. A regime 
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change in Damascus would demand close attention and adroit follow-up on 
the part of Turkish leaders in order to ensure good relations with any new 
Syrian leadership, given the effects such a change might have on the 
conflicting interests of other parties (i.e., Russia, Iran, the EU, United States, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the latter being a very active mediator). Although 
Turkey has severely condemned the Asad regime, opened its cities to 
opposition conferences, and established refugee camps for Syrian civilians 
(and one for military personnel escaping service in the Syrian army), it still 
appears hesitant in practice. Turkish leaders have proved unable in some ways 
to accurately assess behind-the-scene activities in Damascus.  
Fourth, Qatar‟s political and economic ascent, at times in competition with 
Saudi Arabia, is affecting regional power dynamics. Leaders in both Doha and 
Riyadh, however, agree on the need for a radical approach to the situation in 
Syria and have interests in the Asad regime being toppled. Given the strategic 
relevance of Persian Gulf dynamics to Turkey, Turkish leaders cannot afford 
to take a very different position from that of the Gulf Cooperation Council‟s 
two most active states if it wants to coordinate politically with them.  
Fifth, Turkey is linked with Russia by a number of mutual interests related 
to natural gas and central Asia. There are occasional tensions between the two 
countries as a result of competition or a lack of mutual understanding on 
some issues, of which Syria currently figures prominently. 
Sixth, Turkey has not abandoned its orientation toward Europe, though it 
has eased its rush westward in the face of repeated rejections of EU 
membership. Turkey is linked to the European continent by important 
economic and political relationships, large Turkish communities in European 
countries, and Mediterranean interests. Despite tensions with France, these 
fundamental interests remain one priority for the Turks.  
Seven, and finally, Turkey is linked with the United States of America via 
NATO. The conditions of its membership in the alliance have not been 
modified but clearly strained by recent Turkish-Israeli tensions. Turkey 
depends on its relationship with the United States if it wants to play a more 
effective role in the Palestinian issue. 
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Cooperation within the Mediterranean  
Cooperation within the framework of the Mediterranean basin is, therefore, 
of critical importance to Ankara and all other capitals. Given Turkey‟s unique 
capacity to act flexibly in its relations with countries around the 
Mediterranean, cooperation would enable it to play an essential role that is 
commensurate with its economic and demographic weight. Every effort to 
consolidate a Turkish-European partnership would help make the 
Mediterranean a calmer place. However, doing so requires special care with 
respect to a number of prominent issues. 
• The issue of religion and the state. This issue, which affects most Arab 
countries and Israel, should be addressed in a manner demonstrating respect 
for pluralism, tolerance as well as religious, ethnic and cultural diversity  
• The issue of human rights. Demonstrating respect for human rights, as 
formulated by ratified international agreements, should be a condition for 
economic cooperation and development and investment projects. Human 
rights encompass public and private freedoms in recognition of the political 
and cultural rights of all components of a society. As such they apply to 
Kurds in Syria, Iraq and Turkey, and to all ethnic and religious groups in 
North Africa and in several other Mediterranean states. 
• The issue of women‟s rights. Women are subjected to discrimination in all 
Arab countries. This should be countered with support from international 
treaties, and by encouraging governments to adopt policies and legislation 
that can strengthen the participation of women in political and economic 
decision-making processes. In addition, governments should be encouraged 
to eschew legalized discrimination of women by changing, for example, laws 
regulating personal status and citizenship.  
• The issues of immigration, racism and integration. The combination of 
increasing migration and growing economic crises has exacerbated problems 
associated with integration and racism. Northbound immigration flows will 
be limited only if investment in the southern states is improved and 
employment opportunities in these countries are expanded. In addition, 
improving the conditions of migrants and providing assistance in integration 
will help counter mounting social tensions.  
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• The role of the military in politics. It is important to support throughout the 
region a political culture in which the military is subject to the authority of 
elected political officials. In many Arab countries (and previously in Turkey), 
military forces have played crucial roles in political decision-making 
processes. The emergence of new political elites and the organization of free 
and fair elections should replace all traces of the coups and eras of martial 
law that once controlled lives throughout the region. 
• Independence of the judiciary and anti-corruption. The reconstruction of 
constitutional institutions should be accompanied by judicial reform in order 
to guarantee the judiciary‟s independence from political authorities. Doing 
so will allow the judiciary to confront the corruption that has damaged 
economies and public morale in many countries.  
• Syria. It is difficult to imagine a stable Mediterranean if there is no 
transitional phase in Damascus guaranteeing the end of despotism and the 
introduction of democratization. Europe and Turkey have an interest in 
cooperating to find a solution in Syria. Their positions so far have been clear 
in condemning the Asad regime‟s abuses of human rights, but this should 
lead to more measures that protect the Syrian population. 
• Palestine/Israel. A joint Turkish-European effort to renew serious peace 
talks that are based on U.N. resolutions and lead to the creation of a viable 
Palestinian state is important for the stability and prosperity of the entire 
Mediterranean basin. For more than 65 years, the conflict in Palestine and 
the occupation of Palestinian territories have been the source of tensions, 
frustrations and injustice. It is time to reassess the different approaches to 
the conflict and its resolution. 
Indeed, the Mediterranean countries today – those along its shores and their 
neighbors – stand before a great historical moment. Full cooperation in favor 
of justice, peace and economic development will bear fruits today and for 
many years to come. Europe and Turkey alike can play leading roles in these 
efforts. 
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Turkey-EU Cooperation in the Arab World 
Nathalie Tocci 
Talk about foreign policy cooperation between Turkey and the European 
Union is not new. For years, broad convergence between the two parties‟ 
views and visions of the neighborhood has made a joint strategy a worthwhile 
endeavor to explore. Yet never has there been an alignment of the stars like 
today. The historic transformation underway in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region has rendered EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation 
imperative. Above all, the Arab Spring has strongly underscored the fact that 
neither the EU nor Turkey can act effectively alone in confronting today‟s 
extraordinary challenges.  
With this in mind, this paper sketches out the broad contours of potential 
EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation in the Arab world, addressing the fields 
of diplomacy, aid, trade and security. In areas such as diplomacy, assistance 
and trade, there could be a useful division of labor between the two parties. In 
the field of security, as currently demonstrated by the unfolding drama in 
Syria, joint action would be warranted instead.  
Turkey‟s EU accession process is badly stuck. Negotiations were launched in 
2005, but since then a mere 13 out of 32 chapters have been opened. Most 
remaining chapters have been blocked either by Cyprus, France or the 
European Council as a whole. In turn, all momentum has been lost, with no 
chapter having been opened since June 2010. Matters are getting worse, as 
Turkey has threatened to interrupt political dialogue with the Union as Cyprus‟ 
EU presidency approaches in the second half of 2012, and as intercommunal 
talks on the eastern Mediterranean island near a point of breakdown.  
Despite this dire situation, time has never been riper for EU-Turkey 
cooperation in their shared neighborhood. In particular, the historic 
transformation in the Arab world has made joint EU-Turkey action in the 
southern neighborhood imperative. On the one hand, Turkey‟s regional role 
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and the synergies between Turkey and the EU are as critical as ever. Whereas 
the EU has developed aid, trade and diplomatic instruments for supporting 
transformative change in the neighborhood, it lacks the credibility that a 
resurgent Turkey has acquired in recent years. Moreover, Turkish foreign 
policy seems to have entered into its “third wave” (Lesser 2011). Whereas 
Ankara still vies for strategic foreign policy autonomy (Kardaş 2011), the Arab 
Spring has demonstrated that it cannot freelance effectively in its unstable 
backyard.  
Hence, despite ongoing tensions, the prospect of EU-Turkey foreign policy 
cooperation has become more compelling in light of the Arab Spring, as the 
two parties find themselves sharing strategic interests relative to the manifold 
challenges facing their shared neighborhood. But assuming such cooperation 
is both desirable and possible, what could it consist of?  
 
The elements of a joint EU-Turkish strategy  
for the Arab world 
The institutional framework 
The first hurdle to overcome would be that of establishing the appropriate 
institutional mechanism to engage in foreign policy dialogue. EU-Turkey 
dialogue has suffered as a result of Turkey‟s ailing accession process. Until the 
passage of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, Turkish officials met regularly with the EU 
troika. When Turkey‟s accession negotiations were still moving (slowly) 
forward, Turkey also used to meet with individual EU member states at the 
intergovernmental conferences that opened and closed negotiations over 
accession chapters. In those years, Turkey also enthusiastically aligned its 
foreign policy positions with the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). But as the EU-Turkish relationship soured, opportunities for Turkey 
and the EU to discuss foreign policy became few and far between (Ülgen 
2011a).  
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To remedy the situation, High Representative Catherine Ashton and Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu have recently established regular talks, coupled 
with an annual four-way meeting between High Representative Ashton, 
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, Commissioner Stefan Füle and Minister for 
European Affairs Egemen Bağış. There has also been talk of Davutoğlu‟s 
participation in the EU‟s Gymnich foreign affairs meetings.  
These talks should be intensified and conducted under the CFSP chapter of 
Turkey‟s accession talks. However, they should also be brought up to the level 
of heads of state – for example, through annual summits – as well as down to 
sectoral levels, between Turkish ministries and agencies and EU directorates-
general, the External Action Service and the Political and Security Committee 
of the Council. Turkish and European civil society organizations engaged in 
the neighborhood should also be brought into the dialogue.  
Diplomacy 
When it comes to diplomacy, there could be a useful geographic and 
thematic division of labor between Turkey and the EU. Geographically, the 
EU would concentrate its diplomatic efforts on the Maghreb, while Turkey is 
bound to focus more on its immediate neighbors in the Mashreq.  
Thematically, the European Union may be better placed to advocate 
universal norms grounded in international law, particularly in areas related to 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, transparency, accountability and the rule 
of law. When backed by the solid force of international law, the EU, whose 
reputation in the neighborhood is far from spotless, would be less subject to 
potential criticism. For its part, Turkey could focus its diplomatic interventions 
on more specific political topics, particularly those for which its own 
experience gives it greater legitimacy. A notable example is Prime Minister 
Erdoğan‟s praise for secularism during his visit to Cairo in the fall of 2011. 
True, Erdoğan‟s words were scorned by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
criticized by the Salafist al-Nour party. But the Egyptian reaction would likely 
have been far more vehement had an EU official offered the same words. The 
fact that the figure calling for secularism was a leader broadly viewed as 
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Islamist at home conferred on Erdoğan a degree of legitimacy that EU 
officials would be hard pressed to obtain.  
Following the same line of reasoning, one could imagine retired Turkish 
military officials advocating the democratic oversight of the armed forces in 
the neighborhood, or Turkish business persons calling for export promotion 
policies in the region. A variety of Turkish actors could thus send diplomatic 
messages to neighboring countries which, while coordinated with the EU, 
would differ somewhat from those of EU actors and might be better received 
precisely because of the “incompleteness” of Turkey‟s ongoing 
democratization process (Kirişci 2011). 
Assistance 
With respect to aid in support of the Arab Spring movements, we could 
imagine bilateral EU-Turkey action in the area of governance assistance. The 
EU Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) and Twinning 
programs might prove useful models, whereby the EU would engage in 
exchanges and training to support capacity building in various regional 
governance structures. Turkey could be brought into these programs, acting as 
an additional reservoir of expertise on which to draw.  
Turkey could bring to bear its own experience in a number of areas where it 
has undertaken reform. Ülgen cites a number of promising examples (Ülgen 
2011b). One is the banking sector, in which Turkey (unlike the European 
Union, but like other states in the neighborhood) was bedeviled by problems 
of clientelism before 2001, but has since engaged in a radical overhaul of the 
sector that has included effective regulatory mechanisms. It is no coincidence 
that Turkey has already been involved in assisting Syria with its own banking 
reform. A second example is that of urban planning and housing, critical areas 
both in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia which have experienced revolts, 
and in countries such as Algeria which have not. Again, having experienced an 
urbanization process and youth bulge similar to those in other neighborhood 
states, and having overcome related housing problems through the work of its 
Mass Housing Authority, Turkey could bring its expertise to bear in these 
areas more usefully than could the European Union. A third example is that of 
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small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) promotion, necessary in the MENA 
region where undoing state capture of the economy and promoting an 
independent private sector both represent significant future challenges. Here, 
the experience of the Turkish chamber of commerce, TOBB, could be usefully 
integrated with EU programs. TOBB, in fact, was instrumental in establishing 
the Levant Business Forum, which represents business organizations from 
Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.  
Moreover, by bringing in non-EU member Turkey, the EU Twinning and 
TAIEX programs could downplay their focus on the export of the acquis 
communautaire. Aquis promotion is one of the EU‟s main professional biases. 
While reasonable in the eastern neighborhood, where states typically aspire to 
EU membership, compatibility with the acquis cannot be taken for granted in 
the southern Mediterranean. By including Turkey in its programs, the EU may 
be nudged to move away from merely exporting the acquis and toward 
responding more effectively to the governance needs of its neighbors. 
Trade 
Differences between the east and south also apply on the issue of trade. 
Whereas negotiating deep and comprehensive free trade agreements 
(DCFTAs) seems an appropriate way to upgrade relations with neighbors in 
eastern Europe, the same does not necessarily apply to the south. Proceeding 
along the DCFTA path may prove excessively complex and costly for the 
southern neighbors, and in the medium term would do little to induce 
intraregional trade.  
An alternative proposed by Ülgen would be that of extending the EU-
Turkey customs union to the southern Mediterranean. However, this would 
mean exporting Turkey‟s difficulties within the EU customs union to 
countries with an even lower level of development. Hence, like Turkey, the 
southern Mediterranean countries would lose their ability to determine their 
external trade relations autonomously. This might prove costly for the poorly 
competitive southern economies, as they would see a substantial lowering of 
their most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of the world. But 
participating in the EU-Turkey customs union would mean that by simply 
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signing one agreement, each MENA country could be a part of a customs 
space that included not only the EU and Turkey, but all of the country‟s 
neighbors as well, inducing intraregional trade as well as EU-sourced and 
other external FDI. However, any such endeavor should be prepared carefully 
through a transition period of a decade or more, during which the southern 
Mediterranean countries, supported by the EU, would gradually lower their 
tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of the world and concomitantly work on enhancing 
their competitiveness.  
Security  
Security cooperation between Turkey and the European Union would focus 
on specific crises in the neighborhood. At the time of writing, Syria stands out 
as a prime case in which EU-Turkey security cooperation is taking place, 
alongside the United States and the Arab League. As the crisis unfolds and the 
international community converges on an appropriate form of action, the 
precise modalities of the EU‟s own participation will have to be settled, a 
question that will in turn hinge on whether and to what extent it is possible to 
forge intra-EU consensus. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the EU will 
act through High Representative Ashton or through a core group of member 
states (as in the case of Iran or Libya).  
Yet irrespective of the form of EU participation, the establishment of a 
contact group on Syria – the Friends of Syria – featuring some 70-odd 
countries including the EU, Turkey, the United States and key members of the 
Arab League, highlights how a joint security strategy in the neighborhood is 
already being forged. Spearheaded by Turkey and its transatlantic partners, the 
Friends of Syria group is exploring possible modalities of humanitarian 
intervention, potential support for the Syrian opposition and prospects for 
international consensus on the way ahead. The work of the Friends of Syria 
group could act as an important precedent for EU-Turkey security 
cooperation if and when other crises erupt in the neighborhood.  
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Looking ahead 
Though earlier efforts at EU-Turkish cooperation have proven to yield 
mixed results, the historic transformation today underway in the Middle East 
and North Africa has made EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation imperative. 
Above all, the Arab Spring has made it clear that the EU and Turkey can 
achieve their joint strategic interests more effectively by working together to 
confront today‟s extraordinary challenges.  
With this in mind, this paper has sketched out the broad contours of 
potential EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation in the Arab world. Broadly 
speaking, such a strategy could include public and private diplomatic 
interventions, assistance, trade and security cooperation. In some areas, such 
as diplomacy, assistance and trade, there could be a useful division of labor 
between the two. In the field of security, as currently being demonstrated in 
Syria, joint action would be warranted instead.  
This is not to underplay the many obstacles that hinder foreign policy 
cooperation between Turkey and the European Union, foremost among 
which is the dire state of EU-Turkey relations today. But responding 
effectively to the shift of tectonic plates underway in the neighborhood is a 
challenge that neither can afford to neglect. 
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Turkey and the Arab Spring in Light of  
Regional Conflicts1 
E. Fuat Keyman 
More than a year after its first stirrings, the Arab Spring rages on across the 
Middle East with undiminished momentum. Following the fall of the 
authoritarian governments in Tunisia and Egypt last year, the revolution 
claimed the tyrannical regime of Muammar al-Qadhafi in Libya last fall. Yet 
even as the storm closes in on Syria‟s Asad regime, which has committed some 
of the 21st century‟s worst atrocities and human rights violations, the future 
for the Arab Spring countries remains deeply uncertain. Will they be successful 
in their transition to democracy, or are they destined to fall into the chaos of 
political and economic instability? Is there an alternative model of political and 
institutional development, and if so, where might be this be found? This latter 
question has drawn attention both inside and outside the region toward 
Turkey, but has also demanded further examination: In what specific ways, for 
example, might Turkey contribute to advancing and enhancing the creation of 
responsible and democratic governance in these countries? Is it possible for 
Turkey and the European Union (EU) to work together in a coordinated and 
collaborative fashion to positively affect the Arab Spring movement? In this 
paper, I suggest that Turkey‟s dynamic economy, deepening entrepreneurial 
culture and secular democracy can indeed serve as a model or “locus of 
aspiration” for the Arab Spring. Moreover, if Turkey and the EU can work 
and act together, Turkey‟s ability and capacity to play its expected roles would 
be immensely increased. 
 
1 I would like to thank Cana Tulus and Onur Sazak for their valuable contributions to the process of 
writing and editing this paper. Without their hard work and excellent editing, this paper would not have 
been possible. 
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Historical context: The multiple crises of globalization 
In a world disoriented by a multiplicity of global crises, answers to the 
above-noted questions are not to be found easily. Globalization is undergoing 
what is not only a severe, but also a multifaceted crisis. The world is 
witnessing the simultaneous decline of the West and the rise of the rest. More 
importantly, as Charles Kupchan correctly suggests, the world is becoming 
“no one‟s world.” The ongoing shift of power at the global scale is creating 
tendencies both toward multipolarity and multiple modernities; multipolarity 
in that “rather than embracing the rules of the current international system, 
rising powers seek to adjust the prevailing order in ways that advantage their 
own values and interests,” and multiple modernities in the sense that there is 
both an increasing disjuncture between modernization and Westernization and 
the existence of “a politically diverse landscape in which the Western model 
will offer only one of many competing conceptions of domestic and 
international order” (Kupchan 2012: 4).  
The Arab Spring thus broke out at a time when the multiple crises of 
globalization have begun to align themselves with the emergence of “no one‟s 
world.” The powerful revolutionary movement has already eliminated some of 
the world‟s most enduring authoritarian regimes. Yet it has also created a 
power vacuum in the region. Moreover, the lack of experience with 
democratic governance in the Middle East poses a significant challenge in 
terms of laying the groundwork for democratization. In the absence of 
indigenous models for self-rule, reformers will eventually turn to time-tested 
models and global best practices 
Models of transition to democracy 
In order to smooth this process, it is of critical importance to analyze how 
and in what ways a transition to democracy can occur and be implemented. 
The transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy has occurred in a 
variety of regions since the 1970s, and has always been a painful process. Each 
of the various episodes offers lessons that may shed light on recent 
developments. The transitions in Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain) 
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in the early 1970s, the successive transformations in Latin America (Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile and Mexico) in the 1980s, and the similar experiences in 
Eastern and Central European countries in the 1990s all created different 
modes or models of transitioning to democracy from either military or 
authoritarian regimes. Within these models, the Southern European and the 
Eastern/Central European experiences were able to draw on the European 
Union as an anchor. Countries within these regions have today gone through 
the integration process with the EU, ultimately becoming full members. 
Moreover, the South European, Latin American and Eastern/Central 
European cases all involved an exposure to globalization and the global 
economy, which played a positive role in these experiences.  
By contrast, the Arab Spring is occurring both without an anchor such as 
the European Union, and against a backdrop of pressing security, economic, 
social and ecological challenges that have introduced considerable uncertainty 
into global affairs, and which have collectively given rise to crises of 
globalization that have taken multiple forms. From an economic perspective, 
the global economic crisis has led to a serious financial meltdown, a global 
recession and widespread unemployment. On the security front, the specific 
issues related to the Arab Spring, including the regime change or regime 
restoration problems in Syria and Libya, are naturally of great significance 
within today‟s international relations. Yet these issues are themselves affected 
by questions that collectively constitute a global security crisis, including the 
future of Iraq after the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces and the increasing 
risk of its disintegration, the broader uncertainties associated with 
longstanding Middle East conflicts, the increasingly thorny problems posed by 
Iran, the Afghanistan and Pakistan security risk zones, and violence and 
terrorism in general.  
Global challenges stemming from climate change, energy and resource 
scarcity, and food insecurity constitute a crisis of civilization, the third pillar of 
the looming global crisis. The crisis of hegemony and shifts in the global 
distribution of power – trends combining the current lack of global leadership 
and the crisis of modernity – constitute the last and crucial element of the 
global crisis (for further details, see Keyman 2013, forthcoming). In this 
environment characterized by risk and instability, the Western powers have 
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been unable to respond effectively and constructively to the recent 
developments in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East region.  
Although it was an essential facilitator of democratization and the transition 
to free-market economic systems in Eastern and Southern Europe, the 
European Union is unable to play this role alone in the context of the Arab 
Spring. In the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the prospect of EU 
membership proved to be a valuable carrot for formerly socialist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe to undertake a swift democratization and market 
liberalization. Moreover, civil society in these countries had already been 
developed to a certain degree. At that time, the EU was faring much better 
financially, and could readily commit resources in the form of structural 
reform packages to the encouragement of democratization in countries such 
as the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.  
The favorable climate of the 1990s has vanished, however. Brussels today 
has been shaken by the severe global economic crisis and the metastasizing 
sovereign debt problem. Major EU actors‟ recent attempts to respond to the 
Greek financial meltdown have demonstrated the constraints on Europe‟s 
capacity to mobilize its resources and rally public support behind efforts to 
resolve even the most pressing issues. Although the Greek situation now 
appears contained, the possibility of spillover – and political aftershocks – still 
haunts Italy, Spain and Portugal, and reinforces concerns as to the future of 
the EU. Furthermore, the prospect of EU membership cannot be employed as 
an incentive encouraging revolting Arab nations to engage in reform.  
Significantly, the Arab Spring also demonstrated the declining capacity of 
the United States, which showed a quite limited response to the territorially 
broad and diverse uprisings. Many observers argued that the United States 
failed to address the diversity of the events appropriately, at least in terms of 
developing effective strategies to contribute to the advancement of democracy 
and good/responsible governance in these countries, and more importantly, to 
reduce human tragedy, as in the case of Syria. For Woodrow Wilson Center 
scholar Aaron David Miller, it has not been a spring but rather an “Arab 
Winter” for the United States, precisely because of this decline in the nation‟s 
capacity to respond to the uprisings. Miller identifies in particular the U.S. 
failure to engage Egypt and Tunisia in a compelling way, which in turn has 
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directly affected the United States‟ ability to engage with other Arab countries 
over the longer term. While the United States did back the overthrow of 
authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, it lacked a concrete means of 
showing its engagement and support. After the escalation of the uprisings, in 
the middle of the Arab Spring year, for example, President Barack Obama 
briefly mentioned in a speech that direct U.S. involvement in the region would 
remain selective. The new political and economic situation in the region 
demands a new American approach, in which it would act in concert both 
with Western European partners and regional powers. Each of these actors 
have a duty to the newly liberated communities of the Arab Spring to use their 
resources to promote democratic governments, the rule of law, fundamental 
rights, and the creation of a stable political and economic environment.  
The decline in U.S. and European capacities has created a power vacuum 
that has enabled regional actors such as Turkey to have increasing impact 
within the Arab Spring countries. According to recent research by groups 
including the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), as 
well the assessments of scholars such as Joshua W. Walker, Turkey has been 
the “ambiguous winner” and the “rising star” (for Steven A. Cook and Şaban 
Kardaş) of the Arab Spring. In this atmosphere, Turkey is expected to play a 
strategic role in the region while simultaneously addressing global challenges, 
by means of a “proactive foreign policy.” Turkish foreign policy has 
approached the Arab Spring by locating it in a broader global context, arguing 
that the transition to democracy in this region would enhance not only 
regional but also global peace and stability. In doing so, Turkey has positioned 
itself not with the existing authoritarian regimes but with people demanding 
political and economic change.  
Why and how Turkey should respond to the Arab Spring 
In 2012, the United States will hold presidential elections, an event that 
already has begun to focus political debate and interest. In Europe, the 
sovereign debt crisis has been and will remain in 2012 the primary or even sole 
political concern. With superpowers and other great powers thus turning 
inward to focus on domestic issues and problems, all eyes have turned to 
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Turkey as a potential model, or at least a locus of aspiration, for the Arab 
Spring countries. The country‟s image as a secular democracy with a Muslim 
population has encouraged observers and analysts to champion Turkey as a 
model for aspiring Arab democracies. The strong diplomatic and economic 
relations that Turkey has established with the region under the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government have reinforced this perception.  
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu‟s “zero problems with neighbors” policy 
has been instrumental in improving Ankara‟s political, economic and 
diplomatic relations with Turkey‟s neighbors and other key states in the 
region. However, the Arab Spring has brought change and transformation in 
its wake. Conflict and resistance, human tragedy and increasing risks of civil 
war have resulted as well as peaceful regime change. In other words, the 
events in the Arab world, as well as the recent negative developments in 
Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Armenian relations, have made the “zero 
problems with neighbors” policy difficult to sustain. Nevertheless, Turkey 
wants to maintain this policy as at least one of the principal elements of its 
proactive, constructive and soft-power-based foreign policy strategy. Indeed, 
despite growing skepticism as to the viability of the “zero problems” policy, 
many Arab states have come to regard Turkey‟s impressive growth rate and 
the improvements in its citizens‟ economic wellbeing under the AKP‟s 
neoliberal economic policy as a source of awe and inspiration. Driven by 
strong domestic growth, Turkish investments in the broader Middle East and 
North Africa – and recently in sub-Saharan Africa – have strengthened the 
country‟s economic and diplomatic relations with these states, winning the 
hearts and minds of people in these regions while presenting them with an 
alternative development model. For example, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan received a rock star‟s welcome when he visited Egypt in 2011, thanks 
to Turkey‟s reputation as a key Arab ally. While there, he promoted economic 
opportunities as well as improved Turkish-Egyptian relations.  
Turkey has also thrown its full political and diplomatic weight behind the 
peaceful solution of some of the most complex conflicts in the region. 
Between 2004 and 2008, it involved itself – albeit without success – in the 
efforts to secure peace between Israel and Palestine, as well as between Israel 
and Syria, by arranging a number of high-level meetings in Istanbul. Although 
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Turkish efforts seem to be frozen in the aftermath of Israel‟s Gaza raid in 
2008, and particularly following the murder of nine Turkish civilians by Israeli 
special forces on the Mavi Marmara in 2010, Ankara remains actively engaged 
on this issue. Furthermore, in January 2011, Turkey hosted a high-profile 
summit to discuss the issue of Iran‟s nuclear ambitions. Dubbed “the Istanbul 
talks,” the conference brought together the five permanent members of the 
U.N Security Council plus Germany – known as the P5+1 – with a delegation 
from Iran. Istanbul has also served as an attractive venue for international 
conferences discussing the future of newly liberated Arab countries such as 
Tunisia and Libya. Since the beginnings of the Arab Spring last year, influential 
politicians, human rights activists and opinion leaders have repeatedly met 
with their Western counterparts at these high-profile Istanbul summits. As a 
consequence, in a recent symposium on conflict resolution and peace building, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu alluded to an ambition to name Istanbul as the United 
Nations‟ conflict-resolution hub.  
Without doubt, the abovementioned values (despite problems concerning 
political rights and freedoms), Turkey‟s secular democratic governance system 
and its dynamic free market economy have served as inspiration for 
enthusiasts proselytizing on behalf of adoption of the Turkish model by Arab 
revolutionaries. However, one must be extremely careful not to confuse 
Turkey‟s positive contributions to the region with an ambition to impose its 
own model. Indeed, nothing could be farther from the truth, for a number of 
reasons.  
First, Turkey itself is reluctant to impose its own model on the aspiring Arab 
countries. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Turkish government 
has clearly communicated that it has neither the desire nor design to take on a 
nation-building role in these countries. On numerous occasions, it has rejected 
claims that it has sought to preach on behalf of a Turkish model of 
democratization. It has committed to providing structural help as it deepens 
its economic and commercial relations with these countries; however, it has 
rejected any assertions that it is pursuing a hidden agenda of recreating its 
former Ottoman sphere of influence. Nevertheless, it will not shy away from 
using its soft power to inspire these nations to achieve the level of economic 
development it has itself reached and sustained. Moreover, Ankara 
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understands that respect for each country‟s national interests and sovereignty 
is essential.  
Second, the Turkish model is a product of unique circumstances; its 
adoption by incipient Arab movements would not guarantee institutions 
identical to those in Turkey. The country‟s experience with secularism and 
laicism is endogenous to its own reform process, which has been ongoing 
since the early 1920s. Turkish democratization has been significantly 
influenced by efforts to reconcile military power with democracy, and a secular 
system with a religious orientation. However, this constructive tension has also 
served as a model for economic success, and has helped establish a functional 
culture bridging East and West.  
Third, the Arab Spring countries are themselves reluctant to accept the 
Turkish model – or any other model – per se. The Turkish model in particular 
is still viewed as originating from an outsider, and as incompatible with the 
realities and peculiarities of the region. The majority of Arab revolutionaries 
see the debate over alternative models through the prism of the Ottoman 
legacy in the Middle East. Certain countries such as Egypt may feel indifferent 
or even appreciative toward this legacy, yet the majority of people on the Arab 
Street oppose any design imposed from outside, whether Turkish or 
otherwise. Finally, most Arab Spring actors recognize that the Turkish military 
has had a destabilizing impact on the democratization process. Given the 
victories in Tunisia and Libya against military-backed regimes, and the ongoing 
contest for power between the Egyptian people and the military custodians of 
the government, the last thing these movements want is a democratization 
process “assisted” by the military. However, this perception may change if 
Turkey approaches the Arab Spring in coordination and collaboration with the 
European Union, presenting itself not only as a dynamic and transforming 
country, but also as a country moving toward full EU membership. In this 
case, its contribution to the region‟s democratic transition may become more 
effective, and the perception of any such contribution by the region‟s peoples 
and governments might improve.  
In fact, Turkey can still provide substantive assistance to the 
democratization process within its neighborhood. Moreover, Turkey‟s most 
significant contribution will likely come as it shares its experience in the areas 
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of economic recovery and sustainable development. In both areas, Turkish-
EU cooperation is crucial. Over the last decade, Turkey has transformed its 
private sector, made its markets more transparent and competitive, and 
implemented the financial and market regulations necessary to increase foreign 
investors‟ confidence. By the same token, the state has undertaken effective 
reforms to strengthen its social services. Today, the quality of health care and 
the population‟s access to education services are vastly improved as compared 
to the 1990s and 1980s.  
Based on this experience, Turkey can offer effective solutions to some of 
the current economic ills of the Arab Spring countries. As Kemal Derviş 
suggests, the Arab Spring countries need policies that eradicate the old 
practices of rent-seeking capitalism and reliance on discredited state 
bureaucracy (Derviş 2011). More importantly, “a truly competitive private 
sector has to be unleashed,” and “neither the old statist left, nor the rent-
seeking, crony capitalist right had policies to respond” to this need (ibid). In 
this respect, Turkey can use both its expertise with free markets, which has 
developed significantly since the 1980s, and the last decade‟s experience with 
responsible growth to help guide the Arab Spring countries. Indeed, it is 
within these areas of economic development and democracy that Turkey holds 
the greatest potential for making a lasting contribution to the Arab Spring. 
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Tensions in the Middle East and North Africa: Can 
Turkey and the EU Come Along? 
Dorothée Schmid 
 
Turkey and the European Union (EU) are each important stakeholders in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring, both face the challenge of adapting to a post-revolutionary 
situation, and of engaging in a satisfactory way with new actors on the ground 
in such a way as to ensure their own security and advance their own interests 
in the medium term.  
Europeans and Turks were in fact caught similarly off guard by the 
suddenness and brutality of the Arab revolts. Although in some senses they 
faced the same difficulties in dealing with their wavering Mediterranean 
partners, their reactions were not similar or coordinated. This was partly due 
to the deteriorating quality of their mutual political relationship, as a 
consequence of Turkey‟s stalled EU accession process. Yet other important 
factors must also be taken into account. Turkey and the EU are not natural 
partners in the Middle East, a region that has long been a focus of European 
external policies, while Turkey has only recently performed a remarkable 
comeback in the hearts and minds of Arab people, after decades of a voluntary 
lack of contact. Divergences in views and interests between Turkey and the 
EU should thus not be underestimated.  
At present, regional stability appears to be a chief concern for both players. 
Persistent unrest and violence in a number of countries could degenerate into 
civil wars, or reignite interstate conflicts. With transition processes still under 
way, it remains very difficult to set out new cooperation practices or to devise 
sustainable security arrangements on anything other than a case-by-case and 
temporary basis. Neither Turkey nor the EU can afford to remain inert vis-à-
vis such hazardous prospects. Yet it remains to be seen whether the Middle 
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East, which has long served as a showground for the competition of influence, 
could become an area where efficient cooperation can be established in the 
field of conflict prevention. 
The Middle East’s role in the EU – Turkey relationship 
The Middle East has historically played an important role and been 
consistently exploited by both sides in the context of the EU/Turkey 
relationship. Turkey has earned its place as a Western ally in the Middle East 
as a member of NATO since 1952. It took on a role as the Eastern pillar of 
the alliance during the Cold War, and to this day is considered by the 
American government to be a primary strategic partner in the region. For its 
part, the European Union treated Turkey ambiguously for a considerable 
period of time. While the Turks expressed their interest in joining the 
European Community at an early date, negotiations for full membership were 
opened only in 2005. Until that point, Turkey was included in the perimeter of 
the EU‟s Mediterranean policies, where it never felt at ease.  
When the accession process started, Turkey rapidly identified the Middle 
East as a bargaining chip with which to foster diplomatic rapprochement. It 
then insisted on its geographical proximity to and cultural affinities with the 
region, underscoring its theoretical capacity to mediate and handle security 
issues. Such a discourse resonated with the change in style and ambition of 
Turkish foreign policy observable in the period starting with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and heightened when the Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) took the reins of government in Ankara in 2002. 
Under Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu‟s guidance, Turkey rapidly gained a 
reputation in the region as a soft power of the benign type, focused on the 
promotion of peace and prosperity in the neighborhood. Turkey‟s diplomatic 
overtures to Arab countries and to Iran looked particularly remarkable given 
its decades-long hostile or defensive behavior toward these states.  
In recent years, Turkey has presented itself as a bridge between the Muslim 
East and the West, later sophisticating this argument into the “Turkey as a 
model for the Middle East” leitmotiv. Once the EU accession process slowed 
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down – approximately from 2006 on – Turkey began taking a more aggressive 
approach to its role in the Middle East, in an attempt to challenge the EU‟s 
inefficiency in coping with strategic developments in the region. Some of 
Turkey‟s initiatives then gradually yet explicitly diverged from the EU‟s 
positions, notably in the case of Iran‟s nuclear program, with Turkey opposing 
sanctions and trying to broker a parallel political arrangement. In the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, Turkey entered into open diplomatic confrontation with 
Israel following the attack on the ferry Mavi Marmara off the Gaza coast 
(2010). From this point on, rather than being an ideal place to advance 
diplomatic cooperation between the EU and Turkey, the Middle East seemed 
to become one of the areas where the political rift between the two was most 
evident. 
Rising tensions: A comparative assessment of  
EU and Turkish stances vis-à-vis the Arab Spring 
Shared concerns, parallel interests? 
In order to reflect on the potential for convergence and increased 
cooperation in the future, it is necessary to assess the forces driving regional 
commitment on both sides, introducing the differences between concerns and 
interests.  
EU and Turkey obviously share some apprehensions as to the stability and 
security of the MENA region. Such traditional concerns were notably 
strengthened by the succession of revolts in 2011 and their consequences in 
political, economic and more broadly strategic terms. The unexpected and 
rapid process of regime change that started almost simultaneously in a series 
of Arab countries has not yet reached an end. These changes have produced 
both internal unrest and regional, systemic instability, which could affect the 
course of international affairs far beyond the Middle East itself – for example, 
pro-democracy protesters in places as distant as China, Russia and even 
Europe have since claimed to be following the Arab example. On a regional 
scale, the security threat is fuelled by the reignition of old disputes and the 
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possible emergence of new ones. The risk of an intensification of violence is 
multifaceted, including: 
At the intrastate level, with different possible degrees of gravity: plain civil 
war, as in the case of the battle against Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi‟s regime 
conducted by the Libyan insurgency in 2011 with the help of NATO forces; 
looming civil confrontation, as in the case of Syria, where the opposition‟s 
struggle against Bashar al-Asad‟s authority is now taking the form of military 
operations, leading to reckless repression; or a significant degradation of 
internal political consensus, as in the case of Iraq, where the current escalation 
of sectarian hostility may lead to political disaggregation.  
At the interstate level, with the reactivation of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, 
aggravated by uncertainty regarding peace agreements signed between Israel 
and neighboring Arab states; the prospect of a confrontation with Iran 
following potential Western intervention to prevent an attack against Israel 
brings further concern. 
Europeans and Turks do not necessarily assess the potential consequences 
of the crises listed above in a similar way. Their appraisals of the situation and 
definitions of their individual interests are marked by their own geographical 
contiguities, the quality of existing relations with neighboring countries and 
the availability of effective means to act.  
In purely security-focused terms, the risk associated with wars in the region 
is not as immediate for the EU as it is for Turkey, a country located very close 
to several hotbeds of crisis. Turkey is on the front line, and is expected to play 
an indispensable role in any solution to the Syrian crisis; in reality, as it shares 
an exceptionally long (822 km) border with Syria, it is very vulnerable to any 
degradation of the situation there, due to a combination of ethnic (presence of 
Kurds), economic (roads to Iraq passing through Syria) and strategic 
(relationship with Iran and with Russia) factors. Difficulties associated with 
local unrest in all forms seem more distant for the EU. Such events might 
bring to the fore political forces committed to a radical ideological struggle 
against Western values, possibly increasing the level of the terrorist threat. 
European economic performance could also be affected if political crises spill 
over into oil- and gas-exporting countries such as the Gulf States or Algeria. 
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The most concrete worry in fact expressed is that regional disorders would 
raise the number of unwanted migrants to Europe.  
Speaking in terms of interests, the EU and Turkey‟s ambitions may not 
automatically converge. Both claim to pursue a “neighborhood” approach in 
the region, but the label means different things to each party. The success of 
Davutoğlu‟s “zero problems with neighbors” policy depended on the 
establishment of a fragile chain of political equilibriums, with the objective of 
consolidating Turkey‟s influence in the region. The economic side of this soft 
power rested on the signing of a series of free trade and free circulation 
agreements with Arab countries, with the aim of securing the country‟s energy 
needs and opening new export markets to compensate for the EU‟s economic 
slowdown. Turkey has openly expressed its ambition of building a Middle 
Eastern bloc of countries inspired by the EU model, and its visa diplomacy 
has challenged the EU‟s comparatively restrictive regime regarding migration. 
Finally, a few important obsessions on the Turkish national agenda, such as 
the Kurdish question, cannot be easily shared with European allies, while 
Cyprus remains a lasting bone of contention with the EU. 
Responding to the Arab Spring: Instruments and reactions compared 
The European and the Turkish responses to the Arab uprisings were 
determined by these partly contrasting concerns and interests. In practical 
terms, Turkey‟s major goal was to live up to the expectations of its followers 
in the region, while the EU essentially felt constrained to reorganize its old 
system of cooperation with Mediterranean countries on an emergency basis. 
Turkey‟s rising profile as a regional power made it a natural protagonist in 
any serious scenario of change. Its growing economic and political clout and 
its cultural aura created a responsibility to act. The Arab Spring was for the 
country a moment of truth; Turkish diplomacy had to adjust its objectives, 
quickly assess the consistency of the protests and make drastic choices in 
order to avoid landing on the wrong side of history. The country‟s reaction 
came in two parallel channels. The first was passive: Turkey„s popularity within 
the Arab public was confirmed by the debate on the relevance of the “Turkish 
model” for Arab political transitions, even if Turkish authorities tactically 
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downplayed this, saying that Turkey was not a “model,” but rather a “success 
story” and a “source of inspiration.” The second channel was active 
diplomacy, including political declarations (Prime Minister Erdoğan was the 
first political leader to advise Hosni Mubarak to leave office), proposals of 
mediation (at the beginning of the Libyan crisis, later in Syria), intervention 
(ultimately joining the NATO coalition in Libya) and aid (providing budgetary 
support to the new Libyan authorities after the war). Turkey‟s advantage in 
such a chaotic context was clearly its flexibility and the very complete range of 
its external instruments, that could be mobilized in support of changing 
strategies.  
On the EU side, the Arab Spring appeared as a long-awaited moment for an 
aggiornamento of the EU‟s much-criticized Mediterranean policies. Europeans 
had the advantage of precedent, as their analysis of the region‟s political 
deficiencies since the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 
later the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), had strongly emphasized 
economic and social issues, which in turn appeared to have been key triggers 
for the revolt in Tunisia. Similarly, one should not forget that the rule of law, 
democracy, accountability and the role of civil society were all principles 
enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995. The EU‟s 
credibility has suffered as a result of its incapacity to implement such 
principles through regular cooperation programs; however, the “wait and see 
syndrome” Europe has been suffering from may in fact turn into an asset. The 
legal bases for EU/MENA cooperation remain, and a new set of guidelines 
were issued in spring 2011 to efficiently address the dire financial problems of 
the post-revolutionary environments. 
Working together or testing one another:  
Achieving at least minimal efficiency in times of crisis 
Common objectives for complementary profiles 
What type of objectives could the EU and Turkey share in the MENA 
region? Both sides have declared their support for the rights of the people and 
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for democratic values. Yet the EU remains embarrassed by its past record of 
complicity with authoritarian regimes, while the Turkish model may today be 
failing in Turkey itself, where the state of some basic freedoms has become a 
cause for concern. In the economic realm, Turkey appears primarily as a 
business player, not yet as a donor. It is the issue of regional security that thus 
presents the most promise in terms of potential common action, particularly in 
the realms of conflict prevention, by contributing to smooth political 
transitions and working to prevent violence from degenerating into civil wars.  
Each party‟s natural modes of activity can to a certain extent complement 
the other‟s. The EU has built up a solid institutional frame, while Turkey is 
more capable of flexible intervention, notably drawing on its exceptional 
networking capacity. Socializing and mediating remain Turkey‟s major 
strengths, including with actors such as Iran whose relationships with the EU 
have progressively deteriorated. In addition, Turkish popularity ratings are still 
high in the region, while the reputation of some EU member states – notably 
France – has eroded. Managing reform and institution-building programs over 
the long run is a strength of the EU, yet Turkey has recently demonstrated a 
remarkable ability to target aid in a reactive way, as for instance with its 
support for the organization of elections and training of new (Islamist) Arab 
elites. When political pressure or military intervention appear as last-resort 
necessities, the advantage of efficiency seems by contrast to lie more with 
European states, who may build temporary coalitions with the Turks, as in the 
Libyan case. 
Constraints and principles for joint action 
Turkey‟s frustrated EU candidacy casts a long shadow across any attempt at 
strategic rapprochement. Turkey‟s warning that it might completely freeze its 
relationship with the EU during the Cypriot EU presidency in the second half 
of 2012 is not encouraging in that regard. While Turkey views any European 
demand for joint action in the MENA region as an opportunity to weigh in on 
the accession process, some European states, notably France, insist on 
delinking diplomatic cooperation from accession in order to avoid such 
constant bargaining.  
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In the future, Turkey‟s effective contribution to the framing of European 
policies will depend substantially on its capacity to agree on appropriate 
political directions with leading EU member states. At present, the 
institutional formalization of EU-Turkey cooperation does not seem realistic. 
As an example, the currently strained Franco-Turkish relationship has blocked 
mutual consultation on the Syrian crisis. Confidence-building measures will be 
necessary if repeated logjams are to be avoided in the future. 
While the face-to-face EU-Turkey relationship does not seem very 
productive today, triangulation with the United States might be a more 
promising way to foster security cooperation in a larger frame. Since the 
beginning of the Arab Spring, Washington has indeed pushed Turkey to the 
front line, and has attentively sought to keep its allies working together. The 
Libyan crisis showed in the summer of 2011 that the EU and Turkey can in 
fact overcome their divergences and agree on a pattern of joint intervention. 
Despite tension due to bilateral disagreements between the Turks and several 
other NATO member states (France, Cyprus), the alliance remains an arena 
where the Americans can mediate and discipline everyone into dialogue and 
common action. 
Areas and avenues of cooperation 
Global exchanges of views concerning the future of the Middle East are 
certainly needed in order to advance the cause of consistent cooperation, and 
could act as a confidence-building measure. Yet they remain difficult to 
organize at the official level. Parallel or second-track diplomacy engineered by 
civil society organizations and think tanks is very useful in keeping contact 
active between Turkey and its EU counterparts.  
Nonetheless, information sharing and consulting processes at the state level 
must be maintained at all costs, with or without the mediation of the United 
States. Ad hoc meetings and conferences, such as those convened to discuss 
Syria, seem to be the most adequate system for the time being.  
Finally, in considering synergies at the level of financial cooperation 
agencies, pursuing joint activity between the Turkish International 
Development and Cooperation Agency (TIKA) and Europe‟s DevCo might 
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be a practical way to foster political agreement in the longer run. Moreover, 
humanitarian assistance will definitely be a field where joint action could be 
plausible in the future, given Turkey‟s geographical location and its specific 
skills in that field. 
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Coaxing the EU and Turkey to Engage with the 
Middle East 
Ghassan Khatib 
A number of signs in the last several years have indicated that Europe‟s 
attention to and involvement in the Middle East is on the rise. In parallel, and 
for different reasons, Turkey too has become more engaged in the region. 
This concurrence raises a question: Might the two parties be interested in 
coordinating their involvement so as to improve both sides‟ understanding of 
the relevant issues, and to make action by each in the region more effective?  
The Middle East is going through a phase of revolutionary change that will 
have far-reaching consequences. These changes and the consequent instability 
are of great concern to the international community, especially to neighboring 
nations such as Turkey and the European states. The dramatic developments 
underway also come at a time when the failure to end Israel‟s illegal 
occupation and the parallel obstruction of the Palestinian struggle for freedom 
and independence have already exacerbated Middle East insecurity. 
The European Union and European states, especially if they are able to 
agree on a unified policy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, are positioned to 
play a political role beyond that of simply funding the Palestinian Authority. 
Historical, religious and geographic factors are driving Turkey to expand its 
role in the region as well.  
The experience of the Arab Spring has thus far demonstrated that the Arab 
League cannot alone play a successful mediating role within intra-Arab and 
broader Middle East conflicts. The League itself has asked for international 
contributions to these efforts, and Europe and Turkey are natural candidates 
in this regard. However, neither Europe nor Turkey has to date fulfilled their 
individual potentials in the Mediterranean neighborhood. Nor have they 
sought to work together in addressing these conflicts.  
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In comparison to the United States (which has a decidedly negative regional 
reputation following its war in Iraq and other interventions), Europe‟s regional 
credibility is high, giving it the potential to contribute effectively. By the same 
token, many of the rising forces in Arab countries admire Turkey and view it 
as a model for their own societies. Turkey‟s support for Palestinians after 
Israel‟s 2008 – 2009 offensive in Gaza markedly increased the country‟s stature 
among Arabs.  
Given their unique but shared positions, then, can Turkey and Europe join 
forces to serve as mediators across the current spectrum of Middle East 
conflicts, ranging from the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories to 
the new conflicts and obstacles related to the Arab Spring? Also, does either 
have much room to maneuver, given the powerful influence of their trans-
Atlantic ally, the United States?  
What does the Arab world need from its northern 
neighbors?  
The Arab world is going through the second most important phase in its 
modern history. The first critical phase occurred roughly half a century ago, 
when the Arab people revolted to throw off the mantle of European 
colonialism. The current phase appears to be completing that revolution, with 
citizens driven by poverty, unemployment and oppression to seek social and 
economic justice and democratization.  
At this stage of the ongoing upheavals collectively dubbed the “Arab 
Spring,” it remains too early (and risky) to assess their outcomes or even to 
carry out a comprehensive analysis. The various processes are still ongoing, 
and may yet be in only the early stages. Moreover, these processes differ 
greatly from one country to the next. 
The citizen-led revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were very different from 
the armed regime change that dispatched the Qadhafi regime in Libya. 
Likewise, Yemen‟s uprising has its own unique characteristics, and the ongoing 
confrontations in Syria belong in a category of their own. As a result, it is 
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difficult to extrapolate broadly; the needs of Egyptians are different from 
those of Syrians, Yemenis or Bahrainis.  
However, now that Egyptians and Tunisians have succeeded in 
overthrowing their respective leaders and have begun a democratic process 
based on free and fair elections, it is clear that economic and social 
development will be needed to sustain this process. Economic growth, 
reductions in unemployment and poverty, and ultimately improvements in the 
standard of living will all be critical drivers in this regard.  
A statement by European Bank of Reconstruction and Development chief 
Thomas Mirow, published by AFP on March 16, 2012, offered concise 
reflection on what Europe can do to aid this process: “Across the whole of 
the southern and eastern Mediterranean region, we have the capacity to invest 
eventually as much as €2.5 billion ($3.27 billion) a year,” the bank president 
said, announcing plans to support Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Syria, on the other hand, has very different needs, at least at the moment. 
The country has been caught up in – and has become a victim of – regional 
and international competition for hegemony. While the Syrian people are 
struggling for freedom, dignity and improved standards of living, regional and 
international players are backing the parties to this struggle for very different, 
self-interested reasons.  
Arabs are sensitive to foreign interference. One of the most difficult 
challenges for those seeking to provide assistance at this delicate juncture is 
that of navigating between the genuine desire to help and the ambition to 
control, attain hegemony and exploit.  
As Arabs evaluate international intentions in their region, a key criterion is 
any potential partner‟s attitude toward the Palestinian people and their cause. 
It is difficult, for example, for the average Arab to understand criticism of 
Russia and China for vetoing international censure of the Syrian regime when 
that criticism comes from the same country (the United States) that vetoed a 
resolution criticizing the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements on Palestinian 
land. Such double standards weaken the credibility of any intervention. 
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Iraq is another factor driving instability in the region. Lying between Iran 
and Syria, it holds a very significant strategic location. Its current government 
has a vested interest in the perpetuation of Syria‟s regime. Thus, it is 
imperative to keep a close eye on the rising sectarian tension in Iraq. More 
broadly, the Kurdish issue serves as a common denominator linking Syria, Iraq 
and Turkey; any special status Syrian Kurds might achieve will have a spillover 
effect in Iraq, where the question of Kurdish status is already a delicate one. 
Any efforts by Europe and Turkey to exert a positive, useful influence in the 
region must also take the Iranian factor into consideration. As it competes for 
Middle East hegemony, Iran‟s strategy involves influence both on states and 
non-state actors. Neutralizing Iran‟s influence would require ending the Israeli 
occupation of the Palestinian Territory and finding a solution to the 
Palestinian problem, among other requisites.  
How Europe and Turkey can help  
In this international context, both Europe and Turkey are well positioned to 
offer aid on issues related to the Arab Spring and Israel‟s ongoing occupation. 
Despite its colonial history, Europe possesses enough credibility to play a 
constructive role. Arab countries‟ strongest commercial and business ties are 
with Europe, and Arab public opinion perceives Europe to be a more 
balanced broker than the United States. 
Turkey enjoys an even better reputation, while sharing elements of its 
religious and historical heritage with the Arab world. Moreover, its recent 
principled positions in support of Palestinians after Israel‟s Operation Cast 
Lead in Gaza solidified its reputation as a friendly country. Many Arabs today 
see the Turkish model as a source of possible inspiration in their own 
democratic development. Turkey‟s success in combining an Islamic identity 
with democracy and sustained economic development has raised its stature in 
Arab eyes.  
How might Turkey and Europe coordinate their efforts to assist the Arab 
world during this difficult transition? Turkish-European relations are 
themselves fraught with their own East-West tensions. Nevertheless, the two 
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parties have common interests in the region that can be expanded if the 
following principles are observed.  
First, constructive dialogue must be maintained with all significant parties to 
these conflicts and confrontations. This includes governments and opposition 
groups, not excepting Islamists and revolutionary movements, especially those 
generated by the youth.  
Second, double standards should be avoided and a coherent policy 
developed. Europe and Turkey must deepen what are today relatively balanced 
positions if they are to enhance their roles in helping to achieve legitimate 
Arab Spring objectives such as democratization and social and economic 
development.  
Third, Turkey and Europe each must remain faithful to their own ideals, 
avoiding the American mistake of promoting democracy at home while 
abandoning democratic movements in the Arab world. There is no good 
reason to pursue contradictory policies; even the selfish goal of maintaining 
good economic relations with regimes that obstruct democratization and social 
and economic development is self-defeating in the long run, as this corrodes 
key relationships and promotes a lack of public trust. 
In this process, the European Union and Turkey should also closely and 
collectively coordinate their activities with the Arab League. In spite of the 
difficulties facing the League, encouraging Arab states to act collectively is very 
important for the region‟s long term outlook – not only because it will 
facilitate future Arab coordination, but also because this serves to neutralize 
public sensitivities over “foreign intervention” somewhat. 
Europe and Turkey should also increase the frequency of economic and 
cultural exchanges with Arab countries currently in transition. This helps 
foster democratization and contributes to the economic development critical 
to the consolidation of change and the maintenance of stability. 
Official policies should differentiate between Islam as a faith and the 
extreme radical political forces that manipulate Islam to forward their 
particular agendas. Europe in particular must increase its efforts to uproot the 
Islamophobia that has become prevalent there. 
74 Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean 
 
Finally, Europe and Turkey – and for that matter, the rest of the 
international community – should in a serious and direct manner take up their 
responsibility to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
including East Jerusalem, thus correcting the injustice done to the Palestinian 
people more than 65 years ago.  
Europe and Turkey can and should help in this regard by helping to realize a 
two-state solution that enables Palestinians and Israelis to coexist in peace and 
security, within recognized borders. Among other actions, this would require 
helping the Palestinians in their efforts to build their country and its 
institutions. In addition, it would require convincing Israel to halt the practices 
that currently interfere with the two-state solution, particularly the policy of 
expanding illegal settlements in occupied East Jerusalem and elsewhere.  
A historical opportunity 
The world, including Europe, bears some responsibility for the challenges 
faced by parts of the Arab world over the last century. Through most of the 
first half of the 20th century, Arabs were under the direct control of outsiders, 
first of Turkey and then of colonial European states. Throughout the century‟s 
second half, the Arab world was entangled in Cold War calculations, as powers 
from the East and West competed for hegemony over the region. 
During this period, the West was mostly selfish, opportunistic and short-
sighted in its approach to the region. In order to maintain control and reap 
strategic and economic benefits, it discouraged democratization, respect for 
human rights, and social and economic development. This policy backfired to 
a colossal extent.  
In his landmark speech in Cairo in May 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama 
alluded to this mistake, saying that “tension has been fed by colonialism that 
denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a Cold War in which 
Muslim-majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to 
their own aspirations.” Yet only three years later, many Arabs believe these 
comments to have been mere lip service, lacking any foundation in subsequent 
policy changes. As a result, the U.S. government has squandered its chance for 
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change, and today suspicion remains high. Many Arabs thus question the 
intentions behind Washington‟s approach to the Arab Spring.  
This deep divide opens the way for others to take the lead. Can Europe and 
Turkey successfully engage the Arab peoples during this historical 
opportunity, grounding their involvement in support of newly articulated 
popular aspirations? Or will they continue to disregard genuine and long-term 
Arab interests in the pursuit of their own short-term goals? 
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Turkey, the EU and Regional Conflict Resolution: 
An Israeli View 
Yossi Alpher 
This article looks at interactions between Israel, the European Union and 
Turkey with regard to regional conflict in the Middle East. It describes the 
issue areas, analyzes the relevant policy approach of the government of Israel 
and offers ideas for new Israeli departures.  
The primary conflict areas identified by the Israeli security and political 
establishments in the region are, first and foremost, the threat posed by Iran‟s 
nuclear and regional/ideological ambitions, followed by “overflow” issues 
from neighboring Arab revolutions – particularly Egypt and Syria – that could 
affect Israel-Arab peace and regional stability. Interwoven with these is Israel‟s 
interaction with hostile non-state actors: the Palestinian question, and jihadi 
terrorism by Shi‟ite Iran/Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas, al-Qaeda and other 
Sunni groups. Israel's discovery of large natural gas deposits in its territorial 
waters, a small portion of which are disputed by Lebanon, hints at another 
potential conflict zone that could also involve Cyprus and Turkey. Indeed, 
there is a Turkish “angle” to nearly every one of these issue areas. 
One notable feature of this “ranking” of conflict areas is the relatively low 
priority currently assigned in Israel to the Palestinian issue. Ostensibly, this 
reflects the looming dominance of the perceived Iranian threat, along with a 
preoccupation with Arab Spring-related issues. Clearly, this is the way the 
government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu would like Israel‟s threat 
assessment to be perceived, with the Palestinian issue downgraded to a 
manageable problem, however persistent, even as additional settlement “facts” 
are created daily. This situation is also a byproduct of three years of 
mismanagement by the Obama administration, as well as the apparent 
assessment by Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that direct negotiations 
have lost their usefulness and that an alternative approach has to be found. In 
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European and Turkish eyes, the low level of attention being paid to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict almost certainly appears strategically skewed, insofar as the 
Palestinian issue informs and interacts with the Iranian, regional revolutionary, 
peace and terrorism issues, and accordingly should be awarded a higher 
priority.  
In the Israeli view, the Iranian threat is by no means limited to Tehran's 
nuclear aspirations. Iran has surrounded Israel with missiles and rockets in 
Syria, Lebanon (Hezbollah) and the Gaza Strip (Hamas). This reflects Iran's 
ambitions in the “Shi‟ite” Levant (Shi‟ite regions of Lebanon and the Alawite 
regime in Syria), backed by its heavy influence in Shi‟ite-dominated Iraq, as 
well as an aspiration to deter Israel from attacking it. As a consequence, the 
dangers of accidental escalation between Israel and Iran's proxies and allies are 
at least as great as that of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure, 
which appears to be on hold as long as U.S.-led sanctions, spurred on by 
Israeli threats to resort to force, seem to be effective and direct talks are being 
held between Iran and the five plus one powers. 
Further, the chaos and unrest in Syria have unleashed a series of threats by 
President Bashar al-Asad, his influential cousin Rami Makhlouf and Hezbollah 
leader Hassan Nasrallah to attack Israel preemptively in order to divert 
regional and international attention from the Syrian revolution. However low 
its probability, this threat too has to be taken seriously by Israel. Any and all of 
these scenarios could escalate into regional war. 
A more manageable scenario of conflict management potentially involving 
Israel, Turkey and possibly Europe could be engendered by some sort of 
minimalistic Israeli intervention in Syria. Israel currently understands it is not a 
candidate even for humanitarian intervention on the ground in Syria, simply 
because its motives would in every conceivable instance be interpreted by all 
its neighbors as malevolent: as an attempt to conquer Arab territory. Hence 
the intervention would be counterproductive for all concerned. Israel appears 
to appreciate that, barring extreme provocation, its forces must not set foot on 
Syrian soil, precisely in order to avoid giving Asad a pretext for attacking Israel 
as a diversion. Israel has already announced preparations for the possibility of 
absorbing Syrian refugees fleeing from the fighting to the Golan, and has 
offered to provide indirect humanitarian aid. 
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Yet beyond the contingency of countering an attack from Syria or southern 
Lebanon, it is not difficult to conceive “worst case” scenarios in which Israel 
feels impelled to intervene more proactively. If, for example, the Asad regime 
is losing its grip on vital military ordnance that could be captured and used 
irresponsibly by al-Qaeda forces, other radical Islamist rebels or a breakaway 
military faction – chemical warheads and missile delivery systems, for example, 
of which Syria has a huge stockpile – one could conceive of an Israeli decision 
to bomb these installations. Turkey, too, would presumably be sensitive to this 
contingency and weigh preventive action. Without close Israeli-Turkish 
cooperation, matters could easily get out of hand. 
Obviously, contingencies pitting Israel against Iran and/or Syria are of vital 
relevance to Turkey, which borders on both and has played a major role in 
supporting the Syrian opposition. Turkey's relations with Iran have also 
become increasingly tense in recent months, over the Syria issue, Iraq-related 
issues and Iran's nuclear program. Ostensibly, Israel and Turkey are on the 
same side of what is increasingly becoming a Sunni-Shi‟ite divide, and should 
be interested in coordinating their policies.  
In reality, this is not the case. The necessary Israeli-Turkish strategic and 
diplomatic coordination demanded by any of the instances noted above does 
not currently appear to be an easy prospect. In Israel's perception, there are 
two reasons for this development, which is deeply regretted by virtually all 
circles in Israel. One is Turkey's insistence on seeking regional influence at 
Israel‟s expense by capitalizing on the Palestinian issue and supporting Hamas 
Islamists who preach Israel‟s destruction. A second, related and broader 
explanation is that Turkey‟s drive to expand its presence throughout the 
Middle East is based primarily on affinity with like-minded Sunni Islamists 
that are emerging as the dominant political force in the revolutionary Arab 
world – leaving little or no room for a productive strategic relationship with 
Israel. 
During the course of 2011, the government of Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu seemingly missed an opportunity to apologize to Turkey for the 
death of nine Turkish citizens in the May 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, an act 
some hoped might have restored the relationship to its status quo ante. That 
Netanyahu actually rejected the counsel of some of his own strategic advisers 
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and did not offer such an apology reflects his assessment that the pro-Arab 
and pro-Islamist underpinnings of Turkey‟s approach to the region are 
dominant. An Israeli expression of regret would do little to alter Ankara‟s 
basic approach, and would be construed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan as a triumphant humiliation of Israel. But this decision ignored the 
acute need for Israel to find some sort of accommodation with a regional 
player as dominant as Turkey. 
Key Israeli policymakers are apparently laboring under a mistaken vision of 
Turkey as a country whose real destiny is to be a natural regional ally of Israel 
simply because it is not Arab and has a past history of disaffection with the 
Arab world. This approach looks back to the two countries‟ strategic/military 
alliance that commenced in the 1950s, within the framework of Israel‟s 
“periphery doctrine.” It is totally at odds with the current reality of Turkey's 
regional approach. 
Any prospect of Turkish-Israeli strategic coordination in the near future is 
overshadowed by a number of existing and potential conflict situations 
wherein Israeli and Turkish interests are seen to conflict: Israel‟s threat to 
attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure; the Palestinian issue; possible Israeli 
responses to acts by an Egyptian government dominated by political Islam; 
and Israel‟s growing alliance with Cyprus (reportedly including Israel Air Force 
landing rights at Paphos) and Greece – both EU members – regarding the 
exploitation of Mediterranean offshore energy resources that are disputed by 
Lebanon (Israel‟s maritime exploitation zone) and Turkey (Cyprus‟ zone).  
This last issue of energy discoveries poses several intriguing challenges. 
Within two or three years, Israel will become an exporter of natural gas and 
can look forward to far greater wealth and economic power than ever in its 
history. Will its Mediterranean drilling sites and installations, exploited in 
collaboration with Cyprus, become yet another arena of conflict, or will its 
economic clout enable it to mitigate conflict? Notably, too, within a decade or 
so, thanks to a massive desalination effort, Israel will be capable of exporting 
water to its thirsty neighbors, thereby creating yet another economic factor in 
potential future conflicts or conflict resolution. 
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Perhaps the greatest lacuna in Israel‟s regional strategic behavior is its failure 
to adopt a proactive attitude toward the Arab revolutions. Instead, it has 
preferred a passive “keep your powder dry” approach that the Netanyahu 
government has departed from only under duress, as in its cooperation with 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt regarding violence in and 
from Sinai, and its participation in pre-negotiation peace talks in Jordan at 
least in part to bolster the faltering status of King Abdullah II.  
In contrast, despite the virtual collapse of its “zero conflicts” policy, Turkey 
appears to have cultivated its strategic interests regarding Arab revolutionary 
developments far better than Israel, by leading the opposition to the Asad 
regime in Syria and advocating its own successful model of integrating political 
Islam with democracy. (By way of instructive comparison, Saudi Arabia has 
also responded far more successfully than Israel to threats to its interests 
perceived to be associated with the Arab Spring, by using a combination of 
force, dominant influence and financial largesse to maintain a relative quiet in 
neighboring states Bahrain, Yemen and Jordan.)  
Israel‟s fears of being surrounded by revolutionary Arab political Islam are 
legitimate, but its response has proven uninspired, leaving it vulnerable to 
additional revolutionary change in the region. Examples of areas where Israel 
could and should become more proactive in order to project a positive profile 
toward regimes old and new include peace talks or some alternative strategic 
departure with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), engaging Egypt 
and Hamas over Palestinian reconciliation, and discussing Syria with Turkey. 
The deadlocked Palestinian issue, in particular, threatens to explode or 
deteriorate in some unexpected way. Palestinian political paralysis, coupled 
with the Netanyahu government‟s not-so-hidden agenda of expanding 
settlements to a point where a viable two-state solution is impossible, 
seemingly ensures that the parties, if left alone, have little chance of achieving 
significant progress. Here the Israeli peace camp, the Quartet and Turkey 
should be paying closer and more positive attention to PLO Chairman 
Mahmoud Abbas‟ United Nations initiative. After two abortive attempts at the 
highest level to resolve all final status issues in accordance with the Oslo 
framework (Camp David in 2000 and the Olmert-Abbas talks in 2008), Abbas 
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appears to have understood that the Oslo formula has run its course and 
needs to be replaced with an alternative paradigm.  
International recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Nations, the 
Quartet or some other international entity offers an intriguing possible way 
forward, insofar as it would reformulate the conflict into one between two 
states and award priority to solution of the most relevant issues – the post-
1967 questions of borders, security and twin capitals in Jerusalem. Even if the 
pre-1967 narrative issues of refugees and holy places remain unresolved, a 
huge step forward toward stabilizing and managing the conflict would be 
achieved, enabling Hamas to be integrated more easily into the process. Such 
an approach – indeed almost any alternative to the current stalemate – would 
require a far higher level of international involvement than is currently the 
case.  
Israel‟s perception of Europe‟s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
focuses on policy disunity within the European Union and the EU‟s 
consequent seeming inability to express a dynamic and forceful position. To 
the extent that the EU and specific European countries seek to pressure the 
Netanyahu government, Jerusalem capitalizes on this disunity. Current Quartet 
peacemaking efforts, spearheaded by the EU, appear to both Israelis and 
Palestinians to be increasingly useless, and risk undermining confidence in the 
Quartet in general and Europe in particular. They should be reevaluated in 
light of the need for an alternative paradigm for Israeli-Palestinian 
peacemaking. The year 2012, in which the Obama administration is not 
undertaking any risky peacemaking efforts due to electoral considerations, is 
the perfect opportunity for the Quartet to undertake such a re-evaluation. 
In parallel, the government of Israel seeks opportunities for strategic 
cooperation with specific European countries that are less critical than the EU 
as a whole or that share Israeli threat assessments, such as the United 
Kingdom and France regarding Iran, Greece and Cyprus regarding Turkey and 
energy, and the Central European countries in terms of their support for the 
Israeli position in the conflict. One particularly sensitive potential point of 
disturbance in the European-Israeli relationship is Germany‟s growing 
dissatisfaction with the Netanyahu government, seen through the prisms of its 
increasingly central role as the economic anchor of the European Union on 
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the one hand, and its self-imposed constraints regarding Israel in view of its 
Holocaust history on the other.  
At the end of the day, most European countries take their cue regarding the 
Middle East conflict from the United States, where Israel‟s influence is 
relatively strong. Washington has also tried to use its regional clout to improve 
Turkish-Israeli relations, but with little success. Here we must underline the 
potential significance of the approaching U.S. elections for the future of 
American influence over the Israel-EU-Turkey triangle: A re-elected President 
Barack Obama, for example, might adopt a more forceful role than previously.
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Turkey as an Emerging Destination Country  
for Immigration: Challenges and Prospects  
for the Future 
Ayhan Kaya 
Turkey is a multiethnic, multicultural and multidenominational country, 
home to approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethnic 
groups, including Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds, 
Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs and Assyrians. 
However, despite the last decade of democratizing reforms, the Turkish state 
has not given full official recognition to the ethnically and culturally diverse 
nature of Turkish society since the republic‟s foundation in 1923. The 
country‟s ethno-cultural and denominational heterogeneity results from 
diverse waves of migration that have swept across Anatolia throughout its 
history. New migratory flows have again turned modern Turkey into a 
destination country for immigration. This paper discusses the state of 
contemporary immigration flows to Turkey as well as the challenges and 
opportunities they present.  
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Turkey was heavily agrarian. 
However, the subsequent mechanization of the agricultural sector and the rise 
of industrial production radically changed the country‟s population dynamics, 
resulting in considerable internal and international migration. Indeed, data 
from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜIK) shows a threefold increase in 
urban population numbers from 1927 to 2010.  
Turkey has recently become a positive net migration country, in part due to 
a rise in transit and return migration. The country is also an increasingly 
attractive destination for international direct investment. 
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Net migration trends in Turkey 
The number of incoming migrants in Turkey is almost equal to the number 
of emigrants leaving the country. Emigration no longer poses a significant 
challenge for Turkey from a demographic perspective, with the exception of 
persistent concerns about brain drain. According to the World Bank, Turkey‟s 
2010 migrant population numbered 1.4 million individuals, or around 1.93 
percent of the total population. The net immigration rate for the year 2010 
was nearly 0.06 percent (World Bank 2010).  
Irregular migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan 
have been using Turkey as a transit route since the 1990s (Kirişci 2003; 
İçduygu 2009). According to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs statistics, 
about 561,000 irregular migrants were apprehended between 2000 and 2008. 
Turkey is also a destination point for human trafficking in the Black Sea 
region, with victims typically coming from Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan. Turkey has long been a destination 
country for immigrants mainly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, who seek new work and a new life in Turkey itself, or regard the 
country as a stepping stone to employment in the West (İçduygu 2009; Danis, 
Taraghi and Perouse 2009). Istanbul has become home to many recently 
arrived international migrants, though these communities still have a 
comparatively low profile. Kaiser and İçduygu (2005) identify eight different 
categories of migrants in Turkey from the European Union alone.  
Turkey serves as an important stepping stone for transit migrants from more 
distant countries. Between 1995 and 2009, authorities apprehended 794,937 
irregular immigrants (IOM 2010). Political developments in the region 
including the Iranian revolution, turmoil in the Middle East, the end of the 
Cold War and the Gulf War turned Turkey into a de facto country of first 
asylum. Migrants from the region are expected to make up the largest 
component of this flow well into the future (Frenzen 2011). 
It should be noted that Turkey grants refugee status only to European 
asylum seekers. Until recently, it has ranked among the top three countries 
globally in the facilitation of non-European refugees‟ resettlement, with the 
main countries of destination being the United States, Canada and Australia 
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(IOM 2008: 31). Migration policies have been shaped by the country‟s efforts 
to become a member of the European Union, which in turn has created 
pressures for revision of its immigration and asylum policies (Kirişci 2009). As 
of the time of writing, the Turkish government‟s negotiations over a 
readmission agreement with the European Commission were currently in their 
final stages (Council of the European Union 2011). 
Turkey’s growing soft power in the region 
Migrants originating from Middle Eastern countries, African countries, 
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and 
elsewhere choose Turkey because of the availability of informal jobs, 
comparatively high wages (relative to their countries of origin), geographical 
proximity, existing social networks and the country‟s flexible visa system. For 
instance, unlike European countries, no visa is needed for North African 
migrants to enter Turkish territory. Some North African migrants see arrival in 
Turkey as an initial step toward entering the European Union clandestinely, 
ultimately by crossing the Turkish-Greek border. Attracted by the 
opportunities offered by the big cities in Turkey, some of these migrants even 
choose to stay in Turkey.  
Today, the Turkish economy is booming, having weathered the recent 
global financial crisis better than most European countries. With a large and 
dynamic population, the country‟s economy grew an average of 6.0 percent 
per year from 2002 through 2007 – one of the highest such sustained rates of 
growth in the world. GDP declined during the 2008 – 2009 crisis but 
recovered quickly in 2010 (with a growth rate of 6.8%). The per capita income 
(on a purchasing power parity basis) is €10,350 (2009 figures).1 
The volume of Turkey‟s trade with its neighbors increased from $4 billion to 
$82 billion between 1991 and 2008. Turkish entrepreneurs are today driving a 
 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all data are from Turkey‟s official statistical institute, TUIK 
(www.tuik.gov.tr). 
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flow of investment into neighboring countries and regions including Iraq, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Central Asia, Syria, Lebanon and now Greece 
through various business associations such as the Turkish Industry and 
Business Association (TUSIAD), the Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen‟s Association (MUSIAD), the Foreign Economic Relations 
Board of Turkey (DEIK), the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges 
of Turkey (TOBB), the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and 
Industrialists (TUSKON) and the Turkish Exporters‟ Assembly (TIM). 
Furthermore, Turkey‟s free trade agreements with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, 
which conform with Europe‟s Mediterranean policies and the European 
Neighborhood Policy, have also contributed to the increase in trading volumes 
with the country‟s neighbors. 
Turkey is becoming a soft power in the region, with growing ability to affect 
the ways in which other nations act, think, imagine and perceive the world. 
This influence takes places through a variety of channels, including the 
ideological instruments of the state (popular culture, media, church, education 
institutions). The decision to lift visa restrictions with neighboring countries 
such as Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iran also bolstered Turkey‟s political and 
cultural impact in the region. The Muslim world‟s high regard for Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, U.S. President Barack Obama‟s visit to 
Turkey and the spread of popular Turkish culture (such as soap operas) offer 
further examples of the country‟s growing influence. In a manner similar to 
counterparts such as the Goethe Institute, the British Council and the 
Cervantes Institute, branches of the Yunus Emre Institute disseminate 
Turkey‟s culture and language around the region.  
Higher education is one of Turkey‟s fastest-growing sectors; as of 2011, the 
country had 103 public universities and 62 universities operated by private 
foundations (Figure 1). As the supply of classroom seats today exceeds 
domestic student volume, Turkish universities are now expanding their focus 
to neighboring countries. Turkish universities also attract students from the 
Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. On the instructional side, the quickly 
expanding community of foundation-run universities is attracting foreign 
scholars and researchers as well as those of Turkish origin. Because English is 
the language of instruction in most of these universities, as well as in some of 
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the country‟s public universities, international researchers and scholars have 
increasingly been willing to pursue at least a portion of their career in Turkey. 
Fig. 1: Number of public universities and universities operated by private foundations 
in Turkey (different years) 
 
Source: Higher Education Council, http://www.yok.gov.tr 
Return migration 
Prior to the official termination of temporary circular migration policies in 
European countries in 1974, an estimated 2 million migrants of Turkish origin 
were involved in a cyclical form of temporary migration. After 1974, inward 
bound migration increased in the form of family reunification. Return 
migration continues even today (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Return Migration to Turkey from Germany, Austria and the Netherlands  
 (2003 - 2008) 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 2011, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
Note: These figures include all German, Austrian and Dutch citizens migrating to 
Turkey regardless of whether they are ethnically Turkish or of non-Turkish 
origin. However, returnees who lack German, Austrian or Dutch citizenship 
are not included. 
The return migration of the 1990s and 2000s has been quite different from 
that of the 1970s and 1980s. Typical early returnees were either engaged in 
cyclical labor migration or were participants in one of a number of assisted 
remigration programs, as in 1984. Today, return migration for transmigrants 
has become a process of constant mobility between their previous country of 
residence and the country of origin. The profile of returnees or transmigrants 
migrating to Turkey is quite diverse, encompassing not only Turks, but also 
Assyrians, Kurds, and even Rums repatriating to the homeland of their 
parents. 
Public discussion of Turkish migration policies 
Turkey currently lacks a full-fledged immigration policy or legal framework, 
although the government introduced such legislation in 2011. The European 
Union is affecting the course and content of these policies (Özçürümez and 
Şenses 2011). Indeed, the EU‟s impact has been very visible in the readmission 
agreements signed by Turkey with Syria (2001), Greece (2001), Kyrgyzstan 
Germany Austria The Netherlands
2003 35,612 2,470 1,125
2004 37,058 2,684 1,992
2005 34,595 2,976 1,987
2006 33,229 3,338 2,189
2007 32,172 3,329 2,335
2008 38,899 3,269 2,291
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(2003), Romania (2004) and Ukraine (2005). Readmission agreement 
negotiations remain underway with Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri 
Lanka, China, and Bulgaria, while Turkey has drafted and submitted proposed 
agreements to Egypt, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Georgia, Israel, Sudan, 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia. In addition, in 2008 the Ministry of 
Interior established an Office for Migration and Asylum 
(http://gib.icisleri.gov.tr), tasked with generating and implementing migration 
policies in collaboration with academics, NGOs, international organizations, 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European 
Union.  
Migration policy is rarely a subject of significant public debate in Turkey. 
Yet the public did take notice of a new law that came into force on 1 February 
2012 making it more difficult for foreigners to live and work in Turkey 
without a residence and work permit. Foreigners used to exit Turkey officially 
after their 90-day visa expired, and then immediately reenter with a new 90-day 
visa. However, the new law allows foreign citizens entering the country with a 
tourist visa to stay in Turkey for only three months, and no longer allows 
immediate reentry (Ziflioğlu 2012). Those affected are primarily nationals 
from the Middle East, Armenia, Georgia, Central Asian Turkic Republics and 
southern Mediterranean countries who filled informal labor market demand 
(mainly as caretakers, housecleaners, “suitcase trader” merchants, etc.) 
following a 2007 law that made it harder for Bulgarian and Romanian labor 
migrants to live and work in Turkey. 
Impact of immigration on Turkish society and culture 
Created from the remnants of an empire, Turkey is historically a 
multicultural and multidenominational country. However, the state‟s 
difference-blind republican policies have to this day explicitly and implicitly 
defined Turkish citizenship on the basis of the Sunni-Muslim-Turk trinity, in 
such a way as to include Muslims who are ethnically Turks and/or religiously 
Sunni (such as Kurds, Alevis, Circassians, Arabs, etc.), while effectively 
excluding non-Muslims from the implied nation. However, the last three 
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decades have seen tremendous social and political change associated with 
various global and local challenges such as the rise of a politics of identity 
(particularly on the part of Kurds and Alevis), political Islam, Europeanization 
and of course globalization. Turkey is also shifting its political and economic 
perspective toward its neighboring countries.  
Because Turkey is gradually becoming a destination country for 
immigration, Turkish citizens will more routinely encounter a greater diversity 
of people in the near future. Central and local administrations seeking to 
manage ethno-cultural and religious diversity will have to concern themselves 
with the growing number of allochthonous immigrant populations as well as 
with the country‟s autochthonous minorities. Hence, there is a pressing need 
for the state and ruling political parties to display strong political will toward 
the management of diversity on the basis of respect, recognition and human 
rights. 
Problems with the EU’s externalization of  
migration controls 
From a strictly demographic perspective, European countries appear to need 
to find ways to increase their population rather than preventing immigrants 
from coming in. Accordingly, a “zero tolerance” migration policy toward the 
Euro-Mediterranean region is neither feasible nor sustainable in the medium 
and long term. A fortress policy of zero immigration can only lead to 
structural conflicts between European and southern Mediterranean countries, 
and helps to create non-institutional mediatory labor market actors that 
operate outside the legal framework (for further analysis of the Euro-
Mediterranean migration issues, see Piperno and Stocchiero 2006). The 
growth of irregular transit movements across the Sahara desert to and from 
the Maghreb countries (Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) and along dangerous 
maritime smuggling routes to Italy, Malta and Spain are partly a consequence 
of this restrictive immigration policy. The same applies to the transit migratory 
route through Turkey, Greece and Italy. The majority of transit migrants who 
arrive in the European Union countries originate from Senegal, the Gambia, 
Mali, Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Côte d‟Ivoire, 
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Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, China or Iraq, and pass through 
Morocco, Algeria, the Canary Islands, Tunisia or Turkey in transit. 
The decision by European countries to “externalize” border controls, giving 
transit countries a primary role in the containment of migratory flows, is not a 
sustainable solution. Thus, a different approach is needed to manage the 
migratory processes originating from the southern and eastern Mediterranean 
basin. One component of a new migration management strategy could be the 
creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone; this would conform to the 
strategic goals of the EU‟s Barcelona Process and improve opportunities for 
the circulation of goods and capital between the EU and its neighboring 
countries. Additionally, European Union countries should engage in the active 
management of migratory flows by means of policies enhancing the role of 
migrants as catalysts for local development in their countries of origin.  
Challenges and prospects for the future 
Turkey‟s growing regional economic, political and cultural impact has made 
it an attractive destination for migration not only for people originating from 
the Middle East, the southern Mediterranean and the Caucasus, but even for 
those coming from European countries. The Europeanization of Turkey‟s 
foreign policy, domestic politics and economy has smoothed the way for the 
development of friendly relations between Turkey and its neighbors. The fact 
that Turkey is becoming even more multicultural will require additional 
reforms in the fields of migration, integration and citizenship. Policymakers 
and the broader society will have to focus on these issues more closely in the 
near future; but indeed, positive signs already indicate that the country is 
willing to do so.  
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Migration from Turkey to Europe:  
Betwixt and Between? 
Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar 
Turkey-EU migration in historical context 
Due to its geographical location linking Europe, Asia, and the Middle East 
and North Africa region (MENA), Turkey has throughout its history been 
host to significant migratory movements, serving both as source and 
destination for emigration and immigration, and as a transit corridor for 
migrants with destinations elsewhere (Kirişci 2003; Tolay 2012). Massive 
internal migration movements within Turkey have been and remain periodic 
occurrences, mostly from rural to urban areas, from smaller to larger cities, 
and from the east to the west of the country. Following the foundation of the 
Republic of Turkey in 1923, migration policy was regarded as a nation-
building tool, and was designed specifically to foster a homogenous (Turkish-
speaking and Muslim) identity (İçduygu and Sert 2009). 
Diverse patterns of immigration 
One of the most significant migration movements in the initial years of the 
Turkish Republic was the population exchange between Greece and Turkey 
(1922), in the course of which approximately 1.5 million ethnic Greeks left 
Anatolia, and 500,000 Muslims and Turks immigrated to Turkey. The stream 
of people of “Turkish descent and culture” from other Balkan regions 
continued through the following years, encouraged by authorities. The second 
mass immigration flow to Turkey took place during World War II, when 
roughly 100,000 Jews escaped from Europe and found temporary asylum in 
Turkey. In later years, after the regime change in Iran in the late 1970s, almost 
1 million Iranians moved to Turkey, as did about 510,000 Iraqi Kurds between 
1988 and 1993. Finally, nearly 1 million migrants came to Turkey following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Kirişci 2003). Today, Turkey receives migrants 
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primarily from neighboring regions (Europe, the Soviet Union and MENA); 
these individuals have various skill levels, stay for different durations and hold 
a wide range of immigration statuses. However, immigration to Turkey is 
increasing overall. Migrants from MENA in particular have been drawn to 
Turkey by its improving living standards and employment opportunities 
(especially in informal sectors). The Arab Spring of 2011 – 2012 also triggered 
migration to Turkey from the MENA region. 
Emigration  
Turkish emigration to Western Europe was initiated by a recruitment 
agreement, the so-called guest worker program signed by Turkey and 
Germany in 1961 (similar agreements were later negotiated with other Western 
European countries). The flow of Turkish migrants to Germany proved a 
boon to both countries. It solved the labor shortages created by Germany‟s 
booming economy after World War II, and it eased an excess labor supply 
associated with an economic recession in Turkey in the early 1960s. The guest 
worker program came to an end in the mid-1970s due to the oil crisis, yet the 
emigration of Turks to Europe continued in the form of family reunification. 
Other destination countries (i.e., Russia and the Middle East) have also 
become important in the intervening years.  
Transit and illegal migration  
Turkey‟s flexible visa regime (especially toward Middle Eastern countries) 
has made it a hub for undocumented migrants and irregular flows. Migrants 
intending to go on to final destinations in Europe often use Turkey as a transit 
corridor. Asylum seekers and refugees too may lose an initially official status 
and fall into illegality. As a result of the geographical limitation clause in 
Turkey‟s asylum policy, which allows non-European refugees to stay in Turkey 
only temporarily, most asylum seekers whose applications are rejected become 
illegal migrants. This is of particular importance for the European Union, as 
the common Turkish-EU border ensures that any transit through Turkey has a 
direct effect on immigration patterns within the EU.  
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Future perspectives on Turkey-EU migration patterns 
In the context of Turkey‟s accession to the EU, “potential migration” from 
Turkey and its impact on European labor markets has become an issue of 
significant concern within the Union. Three factors play a crucial role in this 
regard: Turkey‟s growing population and comparatively young labor force; the 
gap in living standards between Turkey and the EU; and the Muslim identity 
of Turkish immigrants. 
Population development 
Germany currently has the largest population of any EU member state. 
However, this will likely change in the future, particularly if Turkey joins the 
Union. Figure 1 illustrates this point: In 2012, at the time of writing, 
Germany‟s population numbered 82 million, compared to Turkey‟s smaller 
population of 74 million. According to the mid-range projections contained in 
the United Nations‟ World Population Prospects report, the two populations 
will reach near equivalence in 2020. The Turkish population is ultimately 
projected to grow to about 92 million, while the German population will 
shrink to about 75 million (Figure 1). Consequently, Turkey might have 
surplus labor supply and Germany might have excess labor demand in the 
future. However, Turkey‟s fertility rate and population growth rates are 
currently in decline, while employment opportunities in the country are on the 
rise. Both factors might lower the incentives for emigration over time. 
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Fig. 1:  Total population in Turkey and Germany (millions, 1980 – 2010; UN medium-
fertility variant used for 2011 – 2050) 
 
 
 
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the 
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm 
From a political point of view, if Turkey joins the European Union, it will be 
quite costly for other members in terms of voting rights. From the migration 
point of view, Turkey represents a potential remedy for demographic decline 
in Europe. 
Living standards  
A significant gap in average living standards currently exists between Turkey 
and the European Union (Figure 2). In comparing per capita gross national 
incomes (GNI) measured on a purchasing power parity basis, this gap can be 
seen to have declined in percentage terms between 1980 and 2010. However, 
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GNI in Turkey remains at about half the EU level today. This difference has 
several implications.  
Even given projected convergence with EU living standards in the future, 
especially if Turkey becomes an EU member state, the gap in living standards 
will likely remain large enough to stimulate emigration from Turkey to the EU 
for the next few decades. However, individual decisions to emigrate follow a 
logarithmic relationship to differences in living standards, not a linear one. 
This means that there may be a strong individual propensity to migrate under 
conditions of large income differential, but that migration propensity becomes 
much weaker as the income gaps narrow. In coming decades, it is thus likely 
that rapidly rising living standards in Turkey will lead to lower levels of 
emigration. 
Fig. 2: Per capita GNI in Turkey and the European Union (PPP $, 1980 – 2010)  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD.  
Note: In this figure, GNI is converted to international dollars using purchasing power 
parity (PPP) rates. U.S. dollar PPP has been used to reflect the gap in actual 
living standards between Turkey and the euro area. 
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Europe’s Christian values and the Muslim identity of Turkish immigrants 
The Muslim identity of many Turkish immigrants has become a growing 
source of concern in Europe in recent years. The issues of religion and culture 
have often taken center stage in EU membership negotiations with Turkey.  
As this trend has developed, Turkish migrants in Europe have increasingly 
been perceived as being “Muslims.” The events of September 11 indisputably 
increased fears of Muslim extremism and gave rise to Islamophobia on the 
part of some non-Muslims. In addition, a growing conservatism within the 
Turkish diaspora has been reflected in the increasing number of Turkish 
migrant ethnic and religious associations. Turkey‟s internal politics have also 
evolved in consonance with the religious tendencies of Turkish communities 
in Europe. This has led to questions as to whether Europe‟s secular identity 
and Turkey‟s Muslim tradition can comfortably coexist.  
Unfounded fears? 
As previously noted, migration flows from Turkey to the EU are expected 
to continue in the coming decades. This is one of the primary reasons why EU 
countries (especially Germany) continue to restrict the movement of Turkish 
workers. Yet are these fears justified by either theoretical projections or 
empirical evidence?  
The main methodological difficulty in estimating the “migration intention” 
of Turks migrating to the EU lies in the uncertainty surrounding Turkey‟s 
prospective EU accession, which would pave the way for free movement of 
labor. Current estimations of “migration intention” suggest a migration 
potential of between 0.5 to 4.4 million Turkish migrants. 
However, these estimates may not adequately account for people's social 
and cultural ties to their local environment. Though these represent significant 
practical obstacles to migration, they have commonly been underestimated 
from the perspective of theoretical economics, and have not been sufficiently 
integrated into structural migration (forecasting) models. 
Erzan et al. (2006) suggest that EU membership could increase economic 
growth in Turkey, which would decrease the number of people attracted by 
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the prospect of emigration. After the European Union‟s Eastern enlargement, 
migration flows increased temporarily, but subsequently fell back. Something 
like a migration hump is thus also the most realistic scenario for EU-Turkish 
migration following Turkey‟s EU accession. An increase in migration flows 
would likely follow the grant of free movement rights, but these flows would 
in turn decrease over time. 
Future migration flows from the European Union to Turkey will also be 
determined by a variety of factors (income differentials, unemployment, 
migrant networks, migration policies, religion, culture, etc.). As Istanbul is 
likely to become an increasingly attractive site for international business, 
expatriate workers and professionals will be correspondingly motivated to 
migrate to Turkey for work. In addition to foreign professionals, the potential 
for migration on the part of highly skilled migrants educated in Germany but 
with a Turkish ethnic background is and will be significant.  
Turkey‟s role in managing migration flows from the Middle East and the ex-
Soviet Union countries is of considerable importance today. In this context, 
migration from the Middle East is expected to retain its importance in the near 
future, perhaps even increasing as a result of changes to Turkey‟s visa policies. 
Current forms of migration such as contract-dependent labor migration and 
marriage migration will persist in the near future, whereas asylum seeking may 
decline (particularly if a solution to the Kurdish dispute is found). If the 
Kurdish minority is successful in gaining autonomy rights, Kurds may be 
motivated to migrate internally from western cities back to the villages in the 
country‟s eastern regions. The potential for migration from Turkey to the 
Middle East is relatively weak, due to the tendency of employers in the region 
to favor their own citizens. 
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Challenges and opportunities1 
Illegal migration constitutes one of the most significant challenges Turkey 
faces in its relations with the European Union. Kirişci (2008) emphasizes the 
increasing importance of managing illegal migration for Turkey, seeing this as 
both challenge and opportunity. He contends that the European Union‟s 
treatment of migration as a security issue has adversely affected EU-Turkish 
relations, and has generated mistrust on both sides. According to Kirişci, the 
EU feels that Turkey is not doing enough to combat or prevent illegal transit 
migration. Yet for its part, Turkey has no interest becoming a buffer zone for 
irregular migrants to the EU.  
In line with EU regulations, Turkey recently began a reform of its asylum 
law, visa regulations, illegal migration policies and efforts to combat human 
trafficking. The 1994 Asylum Regulation and 2006 Circular specifying asylum 
procedures and the rights and obligations of refugees and asylum seekers are 
being revised. Turkey is party to the U.N. Refugees Convention of 1951, but 
has not yet lifted geographical limitations that prevent non-Europeans from 
being granted refugee status. If Turkey is successful in improving its 
immigration and asylum policies, then the challenge of migration can be 
transformed into an opportunity. For example, the reforms could improve its 
chances for successful EU accession. From a security perspective, cooperation 
and dialogue between Turkey and the EU with respect to illegal migration 
would be beneficial to both sides (Kirişci 2008: 126). 
Turkey should also pursue economic reforms in order to reduce the effects 
of migration push factors such as low wages, economic instability, 
unemployment and inadequate working conditions. Turkey‟s approach in the 
1960s – that of considering migration as a remedy for unemployment and 
remittances as a significant source of foreign currency – should be replaced by 
a more realistic and contemporary future strategy.  
 
1 See also various contributions in Elitok/Straubhaar 2012. 
Migration from Turkey to Europe 105 
Current migration policies in Europe give clear evidence of an increasing 
interest in circular and temporary migration. This trend can be considered an 
attempt to find an alternative to the traditional guest worker programs that are 
today deemed “unsuccessful,” with three main perceived advantages: 
• Low or zero risk of permanent migration: It is assumed that when migration 
is temporary and/or circular, the “risk” of permanent migration is either low 
or zero, meaning that European countries will save on “integration” costs. 
However, even short-term migrants have integration needs, in both the 
work environment and their social life. 
• Flexible labor markets: Europe also intends to create more flexible labor 
markets, in which short-term shortages are met by seasonal workers. 
However, Europe‟s structural and long-term demographic problems (chiefly 
associated with an aging, shrinking population) cannot be alleviated solely by 
short-term migration. Various studies argue that Europe‟s long-term needs 
will ultimately have to be met by migrants. In this regard, migration is 
mandatory for Europe‟s future at all skill levels. Furthermore, flexibility may 
easily be misused by employers, as it may reduce the bargaining power of 
migrants who come to be preferred because of their low wages. 
• Irregular migration reduction: Policymakers hope that circular and 
temporary migration programs will serve to reduce illegal migration. 
However, this may require the institution of excessive bureaucracy and 
monitoring programs, since the return of migrants is not guaranteed, and 
even circular or short-term migrants have the potential to become illegal by 
overstaying their visas. 
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From a Policy of Fear to a Policy of Potential: 
Migration in a Cross-Mediterranean Context 
Rana Deep Islam 
The U.K.-based Asian Dub Foundation, a rap group originally born out of a 
community project, released one of its most politically charged songs in 2003, 
entitled “Fortress Europe.” The lyrics are as follows: 
 “We got a right, know the situation // We‟re the children of globalization 
// No borders, only true connection // Light the fuse of the insurrection 
// This generation has no nation // Grassroots pressure the only solution 
// (…) // Tear down the walls of Fortress Europe” 
The words shed light on the band‟s negative perception of Europe and its 
treatment of foreigners and migrants. Indeed, the entire song illustrates the 
Zeitgeist that served as the background to debate during the first decade of the 
21st century. Leftist circles in particular have seen Europe as erecting a 
bulwark aimed at keeping out the dangers that lurked outside its borders. And 
indeed, ideas characterizing mainstream discourse during this time – especially 
that of an alleged “clash of civilizations” that seemingly challenged the survival 
of the Western hemisphere – were taken up even by experts, decision-makers 
and public figures. Islam as a religion and the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) as a region were identified as the main sources of insecurity 
threatening the West in general and Europe in particular. Significantly, the five 
key challenges formulated by the European Security Strategy can be found in 
this region: international terrorism, regional conflicts, failing states, weapons 
of mass destruction and organized crime. 
Against this backdrop, approaches to the MENA region were given a 
security-focused rationale. An examination of the action plans created as part 
of the European Neighborhood Policy speaks volumes: Following a trend of 
securitization, Europe‟s decision-makers considered economic deprivation and 
social segregation to be the sources of radicalism and religious extremism. The 
EU‟s offers of economic cooperation, administrative assistance, political 
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reform and trade preferences between the Union and its Mediterranean 
“partner states” were all seen as instruments aimed at increasing Europe‟s 
security. Under this conception, the more prosperous Europe‟s neighborhood 
became, the lower would be the risk of an inflow of instability and insecurity. 
With this security-centered perspective, migration too turned from a social 
phenomenon into a political factor with significant relevance to security.  
However, migration from the Middle East and North Africa clearly displays 
a double-faceted character. There is an external dimension which comes to the 
fore through the steady migratory pressure from this area. However, a separate 
internal dimension is reflected by all those EU citizens and habitants with a 
family background of migration, who have lived in Europe for two, three or 
even four generations.  
How Europe lost its guiding compass 
More than 60 years ago, the European integration project was created as a 
political response to the continent‟s post-war devastation. Integration seemed 
to be a way of safeguarding against intolerance, xenophobia, extreme 
nationalism and chauvinism. The logic behind the idea was plain and simple: 
Enmity among European societies would be abandoned once and for all, 
exchanged for the bonds of cooperation and common institutions. However, 
the EU‟s success has ostensibly turned into its greatest danger. Europe‟s 
younger generations know of war, hunger, unrest and devastation only 
through textbooks. Memories of the two world wars have seemed to fade 
across the continent. During the Cold War, Europe‟s war-torn history was 
depicted as its own “other,” and was used as a projection ground for the 
formation of a collective European identity. Today, we return to geopolitical 
thinking in sketching patterns of in-groups and out-groups (Diez 2004). 
Foreign peoples, civilizations and countries are increasingly characterized as 
Europe‟s “other,” from which the continent needs protection.  
Unsurprisingly, we have witnessed the rise of right-wing parties all over 
Europe. In 2000, Jörg Haider and his Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) became 
part of that country‟s government coalition, sparking outrage among 
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European politicians. The European Union even imposed sanctions on 
Austria as a reaction against FPÖ‟s participation in government. However, 
times have apparently changed, as the same right-wing populism that triggered 
public opposition 10 years ago seems far more normal nowadays, whether it 
be in the form of the National Front (Front National) in France, the Flemish 
Interest (Vlaams Belang) in Belgium, the Swiss People‟s Party (Schweizerische 
Volkspartei), the Pro Germany Citizens‟ Movement (Pro Deutschland) in 
Germany, the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) in the Netherlands 
or the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna). Right-wing radicalism 
seems to have regained widespread public support.  
All the above-mentioned parties share an ideology that includes a critical and 
offensive stance toward Islam. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the bombings of 
London and Madrid, and the cartoon crisis all reinforced anti-Islamic 
sentiments among European people that have been reflected in these parties‟ 
electorate success. However, this mistrust and skepticism toward Muslim 
people is deeply linked with structural and societal factors, namely insufficient, 
malfunctioning or even a complete absence of integration willingness among 
migrants and EU citizens with a migration background. 
Muslims in Europe are predominantly from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Turkey by origin. This is why the role of Islam and Islamophobia in Europe is 
strongly intertwined with the issue of migration from the MENA region (see 
also European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia 2006). The two 
issues form two sides of the same coin. The fear of an alleged “Islamization” 
of Europe has been aggravated by highly publicized and opinion-shaping 
debates over the construction of mosques (see for instance the Swiss 
referendum banning the building of minarets), honor killings, the juvenile 
delinquency of children of foreign descent and urban/suburban riots as seen 
in France‟ banlieues or the United Kingdom. Public rejection of Islam and 
Muslim migrants therefore does not arise from nowhere, but rather from 
seemingly comprehensible day-to-day experiences, reflecting the subtle fear of 
what is presumed to be a foreign infiltration. For many Germans the 
prospects for Turkey‟s EU membership bid are decided not in Brussels but on 
the streets of the so-called problem neighborhoods (Problemkieze, a term 
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describing broken societies in urban neighborhoods) in Berlin-Neukölln and 
Berlin-Kreuzberg. 
EU-wide resentment against people with a southern Mediterranean 
background is not expressed solely by right-wing parties. Indeed, it has 
become clear that the political mainstream is increasingly campaigning for 
support from this part of the electorate. In 2011, the heads of state and 
government of France, the United Kingdom and Germany publicly and 
almost simultaneously declared an end to the era of multiculturalism (Laurence 
and Vaïsse 2011). However, none of the three politicians explained their 
concrete understanding of multiculturalism, or what kind of integrated society 
they wanted to see accomplished instead. By failing to dig deeper into the 
details of how we might be better able to live together in harmony, the whole 
debate appeared to be just a cheap public-relations move by the governing 
elites aimed at reaching out to a far-right constituency. 
The German government‟s contribution to the integration discourse 
culminated in 2011 when Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich declared that 
Islam did not belong to Germany. Such statements are hardly helpful in 
encouraging migrants to integrate, as they might have a different view on how 
appropriately to welcome people with a foreign background. Seeing that most 
are in fact living well-integrated lives, creating jobs, paying taxes and 
contributing to Germany‟s prosperity, it is legitimate to consider 
confrontational rhetoric of this kind as nothing less than a slap in the face. 
What Friedrich did was an act of “othering” – letting a specific group of 
people know that they will not be a part of German society, no matter how 
hard they try. 
Decision-makers need to realize at last that integration begins with an 
integrative choice of words. Indeed, it is true that elements within migrant 
communities all over Europe have seemed to have had difficulties in adopting 
the societal principles of the majority population, as reflected by their 
comparatively higher unemployment rates and the statistics on migrants‟ 
representation in higher education (for the German case, see Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge 2011, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
2009). These problems need to be discussed in a transparent manner, and 
must not be simply brushed under the carpet. However, at the end of the day, 
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the ultimate goal must be to make genuine improvements in the living 
conditions of people irrespective of their ethnic descent, not simply to gain 
votes from the far right side of the political spectrum.  
The demographic bomb is ticking 
With regard to the external perspective, migration from the MENA region 
has been the exception rather than the rule since the 1970‟s and the oil-price 
shock. Though asylum seekers and migrants, especially from sub-Saharan 
countries, are using Northern African routes to reach European soil, only 
about 10 percent of all EU-bound migrants are of MENA origin (Gubert and 
Nordman, 8, 62). Nonetheless, the pressure exerted by migration from the 
Middle East and North Africa remains comparatively high, a tendency that has 
been reinforced by the Arab Spring uprisings that have swept across the 
region. Though Western observers were surprised by the protests‟ rapidness 
and virulence, the demographic realities underlying the unrest have been 
known for years. According to the Arab Human Development Report, 54 
percent of the Arab population is below 25 years of age (United Nations 
Development Programme 2010). This youth bulge has given the region the 
world‟s second-fastest-growing population (Commission of the European 
Communities 2008, 6). At the same time, the unemployment rate among this 
younger generation is 24 percent. With these forces acting in conjunction, it 
was only a matter of time before civil unrest erupted (Roudi 2011). Behind 
these figures is the face of the young Tunisian vendor named Mohammed 
Bouazizi, who set himself on fire to protest a lack of economic opportunity 
and persistent harassment by corrupt authorities. His self-immolation was the 
trigger for a regional uprising that has been calling for change since 2011 
(Fahim 2011).  
Hopes that the Arab Spring would begin a reform process bringing 
democracy and the rule of law to the region have not yet been realized. 
Toppling autocratic systems was only the beginning; the process of 
transformation will take many more years. The establishment of sustainable 
governing systems that represent all elements of society will be a lengthy and 
painful struggle. The MENA region will therefore remain an area of instability 
112 Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean 
 
and geopolitical volatility. Among other indicators, this fact is reflected by the 
growing number of people seeking to emigrate to Europe. At the beginning of 
2012, Eurostat declared that asylum applications to the EU had increased by 
nearly 25 percent. The highest growth was registered among applicants from 
Tunisia and Libya, which respectively saw sixfold and fivefold increases 
(Eurostat 2012). This trend will in all probability gain in strength before it 
wanes. This is true too of the massive labor demand, which will only increase. 
Simply in order to maintain the current unemployment rate, southern 
Mediterranean countries will need to generate 25 million new jobs in the next 
10 years (World Economic Forum/OECD 2011, 9). As this today appears an 
insurmountable challenge, Europe must face the issue of work-related 
migration originating from the Middle East and North Africa as one of the 
main issues for any future Mediterranean agenda.  
What needs to be done 
If the European Union is to live up to its self-proclaimed image of being a 
global power, it must actively help shape events in its southern neighborhood. 
Though an Arab Marshall Plan has been proposed, such ideas have not yet 
been matched by practical policy action. Overall, it is imperative that the EU 
stop treating MENA countries solely on the basis of security-related 
considerations. Indeed, many challenges do emanate from this region. But it 
also offers huge potential and opportunities which are of mutual interest. 
Because of this, European states would be better advised to deal with 
migration in its double dimension. The inflow of MENA migrants is inevitably 
connected with the way European societies are able to integrate preexisting 
migrant communities.  
The added value of targeted labor migration 
As seen above, the youth bulge is leading to a generational lack of 
employment in MENA countries. At the same time, it is obvious that many 
European states suffer from a shrinking labor force due to a low fertility rate 
and increased life expectancy. This situation is leading to a distinct job vacancy 
From a Policy of Fear to a Policy of Potential 113 
rate, which amounted in 2010 to 1.5 percent. In Germany, this figure reached 
as high as 2.6 percent (Eurostat 2011, 68). The labor shortage is being felt 
primarily within the service sector, especially in wholesale and retail trade, 
hotels and restaurants, and transport and communication (World 
Bank/European Commission 2009, 37). Thus, the labor markets on the two 
shores of the Mediterranean at this point seem to have natural 
complementarities. A regulated labor migration from MENA to the European 
Union could help lower the demographic surplus in southern Mediterranean 
societies, while simultaneously mitigating the negative macroeconomic 
consequences of Europe's own demographic gap. Working as an element of 
EU's neighborhood policy, a Mediterranean job agency could take care of 
filling European job vacancies with adequate candidates from MENA 
countries. As opposed to Frontex, any such agency must not aim at protecting 
the EU's external borders, but rather at opening them up in order to actively 
promote and channel the inflow of migrants.  
Diversity as an asset 
A change in attitude among EU decision-makers will be an important 
prerequisite for any integrative cross-Mediterranean migration. Political and 
public discourses about migration, both in its external and internal 
dimensions, are still predominantly characterized by negative images and 
stigma. Instead, leading public figures within the European Union must begin 
to deal with migration issues in a deliberately positive fashion. Advantages and 
opportunities need to be given more weight than disadvantages and risks. The 
goal must be to manifest a Europe-wide philosophy and identity of 
Willkommenskultur (welcoming culture), which ought in turn to be 
internalized by every EU resident. 
Standing up against right-wing populism 
In order to change the overall climate, which determines the ability to 
achieve a positive stance toward MENA migrants, EU politicians must deal 
with the growing levels of far-right sentiment. What stands out most today is 
the evident complacency among European decision-makers. Though it is hard 
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to name EU member states in which right-wing populism is not represented in 
either parliament or government, the political elite has remained almost 
entirely silent on the issue. This passive attitude has created the impression 
that the European political mainstream is resigned to the participation of 
right-wing parties in the political system. This form of inaction must come to 
an end. As Stéphane Hessel writes in his “Time for Outrage!” it is a citizen's 
duty not to react with indifference to societal trends that conflict with the 
normative foundations of European society, in this case the tolerance and 
respect for human dignity that should prevent discrimination on the basis of 
people's ethnic and religious backgrounds. One step forward might be the 
establishment of an annual EU council involving heads of state and 
government, gathered specifically for the purpose of marginalizing the impact 
of right-wing parties and their xenophobic ideologies.  
Strengthening dialogue through an Islamic conference 
As noted above, many migrants and EU citizens with a family background 
of migration are of MENA origin. Though they must not be reduced simply to 
their Muslim beliefs, it is important to foster a debate on how Europeans want 
to interact with Islam and its growing role in society. However, it is crucial that 
instead of simply talking about the issue, a dialogue is conducted with the 
religion and its representatives. One means of fostering such an exchange 
would be the inauguration of an Islamic Conference, following the German 
model of the Islamkonferenz. Through this means, European politics would 
finally recognize Islam as a part of European society. The delicate relationship 
between the state and Islam, questions of secularism, and the goal of 
promoting a better integration of the religion into society all need to be 
discussed in a forum of this nature.  
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Policy Performance and Governance Capacities in the OECD 
Advocating reforms targeting the goal of a con-
stitutional democracy and socially responsible 
market economy, the Transformation Index BTI 
provides the framework for an exchange of best 
practices among agents of reform. Within this 
framework, the BTI publishes two rankings, the 
Status Index and the Management Index, both of 
which are based on in-depth assessments of 128 
countries.
Contact:
Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, P.O. Box 103, 33311 Gütersloh, GERMANY
Fax  +49 5241 81-681175, E-Mail: sabine.reimann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
“To improve governance, it is indispensable to learn from experience. With its qualitative analysis of transforma-
tion processes in 128 developing and transition countries, the BTI provides a valuable resource for understanding 
better the successes and failures of political management. Its actor-centered approach identifies a diverse set 
of strategies in how to get the job done. The BTI is an outstanding instrument for policy learning and should 
be consulted by policymakers worldwide who are struggling with the challenge of building sustainable and 
thriving democracies.”
The Right Honourable Kim Campbell, P.C., C.C., Q.C., former Prime Minister of Canada, Paris/Vancouver
 
“Scores from the BTI have been used as a data source for Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index since 2007. Thanks to its rigorous methodology, which draws on local expert sources validated through a 
centralized peer-review process, the BTI has proven itself to be an excellent source that captures cross-national 
comparisons of perceptions of corruption. The substantive qualitative detail accompanying each score enhances 
the legitimacy and usefulness of the data.”
Peter Eigen, Founder of Transparency International & Chairman of Transparency International’s advisory council, Berlin
 
“The BTI identifies the rule of law and socially balanced market economic reforms as clear priorities in sustain-
able development. It therefore serves as a good reference for German organizations engaged in international 
cooperation. The detailed reports combined with comparative evaluations allow us to contextualize political-
institutional frameworks in our partner countries and provide more effective, tailored support to our partners 
in the sustainable implementation of key reforms.”
Christoph Beier, Managing Director, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Eschborn/Bonn
 
“The BTI is one of the sources of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance because it provides in-depth expert 
assessments in many thematic areas for which the available data concerning Africa is not robust or comprehen-
sive enough. The BTI´s numerical assessments are based on detailed country reports that clearly show the origin 
and reason for each and every score. Thus, the BTI allows the Ibrahim Index research team to check, compare 
and draw conclusions from the wealth of information provided.”
Nathalie Delapalme, Director of Research and Policy, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, London
 
“The BTI is one of the most sophisticated international ranking instruments focusing on transitional countries’ 
success in establishing democratic political systems and market economies. While we might (and should) continue 
to discuss methodological refinements and the often varying interpretations of its findings, the BTI should be a 
standard reference tool for all students of global economic, social and political transformations.”
Andrei Y. Melville, Dean of the Faculty of Politics, Higher School of Economics, Moscow
www.bti-project.org
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Discover the world of transformation
The interactive Transformation Atlas is an innovative tool that helps users explore 
the entirety of the BTI‘s extensive data set. An engaging presentation of information 
and intuitive navigation structure provide users easy access to the BTI‘s key fi ndings 
and allow them to identify patterns and correlations without compromising the 
complexity of the data.  
www.bti-project.org/atlas
The Transformation Atlas provides:
· access to 6,656 individual scores for the BTI 2012;
· a broad set of data from previous BTI editions;
· each score‘s underlying in-depth qualitative analysis; 
· new insights through modern data presentation;
· illustration export functions for users who want to 
 integrate these into their own presentations.
Transformation Atlas users choose their own point of entry into the data set. User 
interest guides exploration, whether this be through global comparison, an in-depth 
case study, a time-series comparison or an extensive correlation analysis.  
Transformation Index BTI 2012
Political Management in International Comparison
Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.)
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Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
P.O. Box 103
33311 Gütersloh
GERMANY
Phone +49 5241 81-0
Fax +49 5241 81-81999
Armando Garcia Schmidt
Phone +49 5241 81-81543
E-Mail armando.garciaschmidt@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Joachim Fritz-Vannahme
Phone  +49 5241 81-81421
E-Mail  joachim.vannahme@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
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